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Development of inflation targeting as a
monetary policy framework
Definition of inflation targeting
Inflation targeting is a framework rather than a rigid set of
rules for monetary policy.  Nonetheless there are a number of
essential elements of an inflation-targeting regime:
1. Price stability is explicitly recognised as the main goal of
monetary policy.(1)
2. There is a public announcement of a quantitative target
for inflation.
3. Monetary policy is based on a wide set of information,
including an inflation forecast.
4. Transparency.
5. Accountability mechanisms.
A major advantage of inflation targeting is that it combines
elements of both ‘rules’ and ‘discretion’ in monetary policy,
and is therefore often characterised as ‘constrained discretion’.
King (2005) noted that ‘An inflation-targeting framework
combines two distinct elements:  (a) a precise numerical target
for inflation in the medium term and (b) a response to
economic shocks in the short term.  The inflation target
provides a rule-like framework on which the private sector can
anchor its expectations about future inflation’.  Within this
rule-like framework, the central bank has discretion in reacting
to shocks, for example in how quickly to bring inflation back
to target.
Woodford (2003) and Svensson (2007) show that the
objectives of inflation targeting can be approximated by a
quadratic loss function consisting of the sum of the square of
inflation deviations from target and a weight times the square
of the output gap.  In practice, the respective weights given to
stabilising inflation and stabilising output are likely to vary
over time.  They are also likely to depend on the credibility of
the central bank;  when a central bank is trying to establish
credibility, a greater weight will be put on stabilising inflation.
Conceptual and practical development of inflation
targeting
Many central banks adopted inflation targeting as a pragmatic
response to the failure of other monetary policy regimes,
rather than in response to new economic thinking.  Theory and
practice have developed together over the past couple of
decades, and there is now a large body of academic literature
on inflation targeting.(2)
To achieve price stability, monetary policy requires a nominal
anchor.  By nominal anchor, we mean fixing a nominal variable
in order to tie down the price level in the long run.
Historically, the nominal anchor used by central banks was the
gold standard or pegging the domestic currency to another
strong currency.  The collapse of the Bretton Woods system of
fixed exchange rates in the 1970s, combined with high
inflation, led to a search for new anchors, notably the money
supply.  During the 1980s, monetarism was the prevailing
monetary policy orthodoxy, as central banks attempted to
control prices by controlling the supply of money in the
economy.  This depended on the existence of a stable
relationship between nominal expenditure and the quantity of
money;  known as the Quantity Theory of Money.  Milton
Friedman elaborated on the quantity theory and argued that
the demand for money depended predictably on a number of
macroeconomic variables.  Thus central banks could control
spending and inflation by altering the supply of money in the
economy.
Friedman’s fixed money rule implied that central banks should
calculate the money supply based on its relationship to
macroeconomic variables to target a specific rate of inflation.
Under this rule, there is little discretion for the central bank to
use its judgement in assessing the supply of money needed in
the economy.  In practice, successful monetary targeters
actively took account of the variability in the money supply
and economic relationships.  Bernanke argues that inflation
targeting owes much to the pragmatic way that the
Bundesbank conducted monetary policy in the 1980s:  ‘the
Bundesbank indirectly targeted inflation, using money growth
as a quantitative indicator to aid in the calibration of its policy.
Notably when conflicts arose between its money growth
targets and inflation targets, the Bundesbank generally chose
to give greater weight to its inflation targets’, (Bernanke and
Mihov (1997)).
Ultimately monetary targeting failed in many countries as
the demand for money function was not stable.  This
instability resulted typically from deregulation plus financial
innovation;  new types of money-like assets together with
disintermediation from banking system.  As John Crow, former
Governor of the Bank of Canada famously commented:  ‘we
did not abandon monetary aggregates, they abandoned us’.
State of the art of inflation targeting
(1) Although price stability is the primary objective, it is common for the mandate to
include subsidiary objectives for economic growth and employment.  See answers to
question 1.2 in the country detail.
(2) The interaction between theory and practice is discussed in Hammond, Kanbur and
Prasad (eds) (2009).6 Handbook No. 29  State of the art of inflation targeting
The failure of money targeting in the mid-1980s and the
collapse of fixed exchange rate pegs in the early 1990s was
followed by the emergence of inflation targeting with floating
exchange rates as the new monetary policy framework of
choice.  The framework was consistent with the main tenets of
the prevailing academic consensus of the time about what
monetary policy can and cannot do.
What does monetary theory tell us?  First, as both Friedman
and Phelps showed, a permanently higher rate of inflation
does not lead to higher growth and employment.  Acceptance
of this concept supported a move away from monetary policy
as tool of short-term demand management, or fine tuning, to
afocus on the medium-term goal of price stability, which lies
at the heart of inflation targeting.(1) Second, there has been
an increasing recognition of the benefits of low and stable
inflation — and equally an awareness of the costs of inflation;
low inflation is a social good.  In inflation-targeting regimes,
price stability is the primary objective for central banks.
Third, the literature increasingly stressed the importance of
inflation expectations in monetary policy.  The effect of
monetary policy decisions on private sector expectations
became an important consideration for policymakers.
Against this evolving consensus among economists, inflation
targeting was seen as an effective way of anchoring inflation
expectations.
Empirical studies on inflation targeting
There are a number of studies comparing the performance of
inflation-targeting central banks with non-inflation targeters.
Ball and Sheridan (2003) compared monetary policy outcomes
in OECD countries and found that those with a history of high
inflation before the 1990s subsequently experienced a larger
degree of disinflation than countries with a history of low
inflation.  They argued that ‘Once one controls for regression
to the mean, there is no evidence that inflation targeting
improves performance’.
Other studies find the opposite.  Hyvonen (2004) extended
the Ball and Sheridan analysis and found that the adoption of
inflation targeting at least partly contributed to inflation
convergence in the 1990s.  Vega and Winkelried (2005) found
that inflation targeting helped reduce the level and volatility of
inflation in the countries that adopted it.
While the evidence on whether inflation targeters have
outperformed non-inflation targeters by delivering price
stability is not conclusive, there is more robust empirical
evidence that a quantitative target for inflation can inform
and anchor inflation expectations.  Orphanides and
Williams (2003) showed that the systematic approach to
policy that characterises inflation targeting makes it
predictable and results in more influence over expectations.
By examining the extent to which expected inflation moves in
response to economic news, Levin et al (2004) find evidence
that inflation persistence is lower, and expectations better
anchored, in inflation-targeting countries.(2)
There is some empirical evidence on the performance of
inflation targeting in emerging market economies.  Research
from the IMF(3)found that ‘inflation targeting appears to have
been associated with lower inflation, lower inflation
expectations and lower inflation volatility relative to countries
that have not adopted it’.  Moreover these gains in inflation
performance were achieved with no adverse effects on output
and interest rate volatility.  The IMF also considered which
monetary policy frameworks had been most successful in
anchoring inflation expectations in the wake of the oil and
food price shocks in 2007, concluding that ‘in emerging
economies, inflation targeting seems to have recently been
more effective than alternative monetary policy frameworks in
anchoring expectations’.(4)
More recently, Rogers (2010) found that inflation targeting
proved resilient in the financial crisis while Carvalho-Filho
(2010) suggested that the monetary policy of inflation
targeters appeared to be more suited to dealing with the crisis.
Empirical evidence on the performance of inflation targeting is
not unanimous but broadly supportive of the effectiveness of
the framework in delivering low inflation and anchoring
inflation expectations in both industrialised and emerging
market economies.  However there is an important point to be
made about endogeneity.  Many countries that adopted
inflation targeting did so as part of a wider process of political
and economic reform.  Often this involved moves to
strengthen the institutional structure of policymaking, for
example giving statutory independence to the central bank.
In some countries, the adoption of inflation targeting as a new
monetary policy framework was also accompanied by better
fiscal policies (notably in Latin American countries).  The
adoption of inflation targeting has often been accompanied by
a building up of technical capacity within the central bank, and
an improvement in the quality of macroeconomic data.  As
inflation targeting depends to a large extent on the interest
rate channel to transmit monetary policy, some emerging
market economies also took steps to strengthen and develop
the financial sector.  It seems likely therefore that the
improvement in monetary policy outcomes after the adoption
of inflation targeting reflects improved economic policymaking
in a broader sense.(5)
(1) This is not to say that monetary policy does not affect output and inflation in the
short run, simply that the long and variable lags in the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy mean that monetary policy is not ideal for short-term demand
management.
(2) See also Gürkaynak et al (2006).
(3) See IMF World Economic Outlook, Summer 2005.
(4) See IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2008.
(5) The IMF notes that ‘the apparent benefits of inflation targeting may reflect in part the
general quality of domestic monetary management in these countries and their levels
of development more broadly’.Handbook No. 29 State of the art of inflation targeting 7
Fully fledged inflation targeters
Chart 1 shows the dates of adoption of inflation targeting(1)for
the 27 countries operating a fully fledged inflation-targeting
regime at the start of 2009, and the inflation rate at adoption.
The set of inflation-targeting central banks is very
heterogeneous, including nine industrialised and 18 developing
and emerging market countries from every continent.  The first
country to adopt inflation targeting was New Zealand in
December 1989, and the most recent Serbia, in 2009.  The
only central banks to have exited from inflation targeting are
Finland, Spain and Slovakia, in each case when they adopted
the euro.  Some countries adopted inflation targeting while
they were transition economies;  the Czech Republic, Hungary
Poland and latterly Armenia.  Several emerging market
countries adopted inflation targeting in the wake of the 1997
crisis, which forced a number of currencies off their fixed
exchange rate pegs.
Chart 1 also illustrates that most countries adopted inflation
targeting when inflation was already low (and indeed negative
in Peru).  This supports the argument that inflation targeting
may not be the optimal monetary policy regime for bringing
inflation down, but it has proved effective at anchoring
inflation expectations around the target, and so keeping
inflation low and stable.
The main reason why low inflation is often regarded as a
‘precondition’ for inflation targeting is the difficulty of
forecasting inflation, and hitting an inflation target, in
conditions of high and volatile inflation.  The central bank risks
losing credibility from target misses in such circumstances.
This explains why many central banks waited until inflation
was under control before formally introducing inflation
targeting.  However the experience of Israel and Guatemala
shows that inflation targeting has successfully been used as a
disinflationary strategy.  (In the case of Israel, with an informal
inflation-targeting regime.)
Inflation-targeting frameworks
Legal mandate and central bank independence
Most definitions of inflation targeting include the requirement
that price stability is the main goal of monetary policy.  This is
usually enshrined in the central bank law.  In many cases the
central bank law also states that, as a subsidiary objective, the
central bank will support economic prosperity and welfare
more broadly.  The individual country tables show considerable
diversity in the precise legal mandates of inflation targeters.
Australia has a dual mandate for price stability and
employment, for example, while in Canada the main role of
the central bank is ‘to promote the economic and financial
welfare of Canada’.  In the wake of the financial crisis that
started in 2007, the legal mandates of several central banks,
including the Bank of England, have been expanded to include
a financial stability remit.  
Most inflation-targeting central banks have statutory
independence.(2) The literature on central bank independence
often distinguishes between ‘goal independence’ ie the central
bank has autonomy in setting the objective of monetary
policy, and ‘instrument independence’, ie the central bank
conducts monetary policy to achieve the inflation objective
independent of government influence.  In practice the
distinction is less clear-cut.  The ultimate goal of monetary
policy, ie price stability, is, as we have seen, usually enshrined
in law.  ‘Goal independence’ then becomes a second-order
question of defining ‘price stability’ ie setting the inflation
target.(3)
When inflation is not at its steady state, as was the case in
several emerging market countries when they adopted
inflation targeting, setting the inflation target and determining
the path and pace of disinflation are clearly more substantial
policy questions.  The ability to set the inflation target was
seen as an essential part of central bank independence.  On the
other hand, it is clearly beneficial for the government to make
an explicit commitment to the inflation target, which is more
likely when the target is jointly determined, in order to
promote better co-ordination — or at least no conflict —
between fiscal and monetary policy.  And government
involvement in setting the target adds democratic legitimacy
to the policy, which can help command public support.
New
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Sources:  Bank of England and other central bank websites.
Chart 1 27 countries operating a fully fledged
inflation-targeting regime
(1) Chart 1 shows the date of formal adoption of inflation targeting.  Several countries
had pursued a form of implicit or informal inflation targeting before the formal start
date.
(2) The Central Bank of Brazil is the exception to the general rule;  it does not have
statutory independence;  neither do the Governors or Deputy Governors have fixed
terms of appointment.
(3) The European Central Bank (ECB) is regarded as one of the most independent central
banks.  Here, the goal of monetary policy is set out in the Treaty and Statutes of the
ESCB as price stability.  The role of the ECB has been to define price stability, currently
a level of inflation ‘below but close to’ 2% per annum.8 Handbook No. 29  State of the art of inflation targeting
For inflation targeting the key requirement is instrument or
operational independence.  All 27 inflation-targeting central
banks have operational independence.(1) In the majority of
inflation-targeting countries — 15 out of 27 — the inflation
target is jointly determined by the government and central
bank.  In nine cases the central bank sets the target, and in
three cases, Norway, South Africa and the United Kingdom,
the target is set by the government (Chart 2).  Among the nine
industrialised countries, Sweden is the only country in which
the government is not involved, either solely or in conjunction
with the central bank, in setting the target.
The inflation targets of industrialised countries all lie between
1% and 3% (year-on-year increase in inflation).  This reflects
the consensus interpretation of the general range of inflation
that is consistent with price stability in these countries.  It
would be difficult therefore for governments in these countries
to adopt a higher inflation target as this would undermine
credibility.  So, even where the target is set by the government
alone, in practice, in industrialised countries, the government
is highly constrained in setting an operational definition of
price stability.
It would appear de jure that central banks in developing and
emerging markets have a greater degree of independence:  in
eight cases, mainly in Latin American countries,(2) the target is
determined solely by the central bank, while in the other nine
cases the target is jointly determined.  De facto, the picture is
more complex.  In Colombia and Guatemala, for example, the
Minister of Finance sits on the decision-making board of the
central bank, so there is some government influence on setting
the target.
What level should the target be?
There is some mismatch between theory and practice here.
Theory suggests that the optimal inflation rate should be zero
(in the New Keynesian paradigm), or negative (according to
the Friedman Rule).(3) In practice, all inflation-targeting
central banks have positive targets.  How can we explain the
discrepancy between theory and practice?  The reasons would
seem to be largely practical.
The first reason is purely statistical.  Measured inflation tends
to overstate actual inflation by around 0.5 percentage
points,(4) so a margin above zero is required to compensate
for this effect.  Another argument is that a positive inflation
target decreases the probability of hitting the zero lower
bound on nominal rates, a point that had operational
importance in the global economic slowdown experienced in
2008–09.  It is likely that the costs of deflation are greater
than the costs of inflation, so a positive inflation target is
desirable to avoid the risk of deflation, and the resulting
debt-deflation.(5) In addition, the conventional wisdom in
recent years has been that a positive inflation target is
desirable if there is downward nominal wage resistance.
Interestingly, early evidence during the economic recession of
2008–09 suggests that wages were more downwardly flexible
than previously supposed.(6)
Given the lack of a precise definition of price stability, central
banks have focussed on reducing inflation to a level where
people do not worry about it.  The consensus seems to be that
above a threshold of around 3%–4%, inflation imposes welfare
costs, while the plausible gains from reducing inflation below
about 2% are unlikely to outweigh the advantages of a positive
inflation target.
There is even less guidance in the literature on the optimal
level of inflation in developing and emerging countries,
though Balassa-Samuelson effects imply that optimal
inflation in these countries should be a little higher than in
industrialised countries.
Table A shows the numerical inflation targets in place at the
start of 2012.  Industrialised countries all have inflation
targets between 1% and 3%.  Korea is at the top of this narrow
range, with a target of 3% plus or minus one percentage point.
Some non-industrialised countries also have inflation targets
in this range;  2% in Peru;  2% in the Czech Republic and 2.5%
in Poland.  A further three countries — Chile, Hungary and
Mexico — have a target of 3% and Colombia had a target
range of 2%–4%.  Only one country had a target above 5%,
namely Ghana with a target of 8.7%.




















Number of central banks
Sources:  Bank of England and other central bank websites.
(1) An exception to the rule was the United Kingdom experience between 1992 and 1997
when interest rate decisions were made by government.
(2) Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Guatemala, Hungary, Mexico, Peru and Poland.
(3) Phelps argued that the Friedman rule ignores the effects of taxation:  inflation is a
source of tax revenue.  At low rates of inflation, distortions associated with the
inflation tax might be minor.  
(4) The Boskin Commission in 1996 found that CPI in the United States overstated
inflation by around 1.1 percentage points in 1996.  The Bank of England estimated
bias in the United Kingdom to be between 0.5 percentage point and 0.75 percentage
point.  See Bank of England Working Paper no. 47.
(5) Deflation means that the nominal value of assets falls, but the nominal value of debt
does not.  So the real cost of servicing debt increases.
(6) See for example research published by the Wage Dynamics Network chaired by the
European Central Bank.Handbook No. 29 State of the art of inflation targeting 9
Target horizon
The target horizon tends to depend on whether inflation is
within the price stability range.  In the 19 countries with
inflation targets of 3% or less, the target horizon tends to be
medium term (this includes target horizons of two years or
more, and those specified as ‘at all times’).  Medium-term
targets have the advantage of anchoring inflation
expectations, and explicitly allowing for short-term
divergences from the target when shocks hit the economy.
The target horizon may also depend on the length of the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy.  With a longer
transmission mechanism, the central bank is not able to affect
inflation in the short run.
Where a disinflationary strategy is employed, inflation targets
are often set annually.  In emerging markets, there is often a
quicker pass through from policy rates to inflation, so a shorter
policy horizon is warranted.  And an annual target is often seen
as good for accountability.  Countries on a disinflationary path
will often also indicate the medium-term target in order to
anchor inflation expectations.
Target measure
All 27 inflation targeters use the consumer prices index (CPI)
as their operational target, and all now use the headline rather
than the core measure.  This is largely for practical and
operational reasons:  CPI is available on a monthly basis,
Table A Individual countries’ inflation targets
Target set by Target measure Target 2012 Target type Multiple targets? Target horizon
Armenia G and CB H CPI 4% ±1.5 pp P + T – Medium term
Australia G and CB H CPI 2%–3% Range – Medium term
Brazil G and CB H CPI 4.5% ±2 pp P + T 2012 and 2013 Yearly target
Canada G and CB H CPI 2% (mid-point P + T – Six-eight quarters;  current target extends
of 1%–3%) to December 2016
Chile CB H CPI 3% ±1 pp P + T – Around two years
Colombia CB H CPI 2%–4% Range – Medium term
Czech Republic CB H CPI 2% ±1 pp P + T – Medium term, 12–18 months
Ghana G and CB H CPI 8.7% ±2 pp P + T End 2012 and 2013 18-24 months
Guatemala CB H CPI 4.5% ±1 pp P + T 2012 and 2013 End of year
Hungary CB H CPI 3% Point – Medium term
Iceland G and CB H CPI 2.5% Point – On average
Indonesia G and CB H CPI 4.5% ±1 pp P + T – Medium term
Israel G and CB H CPI 1%–3% Range – Within two years
Mexico CB H CPI 3% ±1 pp P + T – Medium term
New Zealand G and CB H CPI 1%–3% Range – Medium term
Norway G H CPI 2.5% Point – Medium term
Peru CB H CPI 2% ±1 pp P + T – At all times
Philippines G and CB H CPI 4.0% ±1 pp P + T – Medium term (from 2012–2014)
Poland CB H CPI 2.5% ±1 pp P + T – Medium term
Romania G and CB H CPI 3% ±1 pp P + T – Medium-term target from 2013
Serbia G and CB H CPI 4.0% ±1.5 pp P + T – Medium term
South Africa G H CPI 3%–6% Range – On a continuous basis
South Korea CB (with G) H CPI 3% ±1 pp P + T – Three years
Sweden CB H CPI 2% Point – Normally two years
Thailand G and CB H CPI(a) 3.0% ±1.5 pp(a) P + T Target set annually Eight quarters
Turkey G and CB H CPI 5.0% ±2 pp P + T 2012 and 2013 Multi year (Three years)
United Kingdom G H CPI 2% Point – At all times
Note:
CB = Central bank.
G = Government.
H CPI = Headline CPI.
P + T = Point with tolerance band.
pp = percentage point(s).
(a) Target proposed by central bank at start of 2012, pending cabinet approval.  See page 42.10 Handbook No. 29  State of the art of inflation targeting
whereas other measure, which may be preferred for theoretical
reasons, such as the GDP deflator, are only available quarterly.
While a core measure is less volatile and may be more
responsive to the policy rate, the headline measure has the
overwhelming advantage of being familiar to the public.  Korea
used a core measure of inflation for the target measure from
2000–06(1) and then reverted to headline CPI.  Moreover,
measures of core inflation often exclude food as a volatile
component.  In some developing countries food can be around
40% of the CPI basket and excluding it would simply lack
credibility.
While headline CPI is the preferred target measure, many
central banks also look at measures of core inflation as an
indicator of underlying inflationary pressures in the economy.
Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Ghana, Hungary, Norway,
Poland, Sweden and Turkey all publish forecasts of core
inflation in addition to headline inflation.(2) The shocks to oil
and food prices in 2007 demonstrated the importance of
interpreting core inflation measures with care.  The rises in
prices of food and utilities led to falls in income available for
consumption of other goods and services, which in turn helped
keep price rises in these sectors (core inflation) subdued.  But it
would have been misleading to interpret the low levels of core
inflation solely as reflecting subdued underlying inflation;  core
inflation must be interpreted in the light of what is happening
in the economy as a whole.
Point or range targets?
Point targets for inflation, including point targets with
tolerance bands, have the advantage of being very precise and
giving a clear signal to the markets of the central bank’s
objective.  They can also have the advantage of being
symmetric, which helps communicate the central bank’s desire
to avoid deflation as robustly as it avoids inflation.  This has
been important at times when the threat of deflation has been
a concern.  A point target can also help convey the
medium-term nature of the objective:  it is obviously
impossible for inflation to hit the point target month in month
out.  Finally, a point target may be preferable when the
volatility of inflation outturns is wider than the width of a
narrow band.
With a target range it is very clear whether the target has been
hit or missed.  Ranges can also convey the sense that the
central bank has imprecise control over the inflation objective,
and that the central bank can accommodate temporary shocks
to price level.  In the same way, a target range allows a degree
of output stabilisation.
In practice the majority of central banks, particularly those
adopting inflation targeting later, have opted for the best of
both worlds, with 17 inflation targeters expressing the target as
a point with a tolerance band.  Five central banks (Hungary,
Iceland, Norway, Sweden(3) and the United Kingdom)(4) have
simple point targets while the other five countries have a
target range.
Decision-making under inflation targeting
This section looks at the decision-making process in
inflation-targeting central banks.  In most cases a
decision-making committee meets regularly at pre-announced
rates meetings to decide what interest rates (or other policy
measures) are necessary to achieve the inflation target.  But
there are many variations on the model.
Decision-making body
Inflation targeters tend to make decisions by committee.
Even in New Zealand where the Governor is the sole
decision-maker, the Official Cash Rate Advisory Group
(OCRAG), including two external appointees, serves in an
advisory role.  In Israel, where the Governor had formerly been
the sole decision-maker, a new law was passed in 2010 to
create a Monetary Committee with six members.  (See
page 30 for details).  In thirteen countries the policy decision is
taken by the Board of the central bank and in eleven countries
the MPC decides on interest rates.  The rationale for a separate
MPC is usually to delegate the monetary policy decision to
monetary policy experts.  In the United Kingdom, the law
requires all MPC members to be appointed on the basis of their
experience or expertise in monetary policy.  In some countries,
such as Armenia and the Philippines, there is a two-stage
process under which an internal MPC or Advisory Committee
of technical experts makes recommendations to the Board,
which is formally responsible for monetary policy decisions.
Size and composition of committee
The average size of decision-making committee is seven
people, and this does not seem to be related to the size of the
economy.  Poland has the largest committee of ten;  several
central banks have five members on their committee.  There is
no clear pattern on the composition of the Board or MPC, with
some committees staffed by internal central bank officials, and
an equal number by central bank experts plus external
appointees (Table B).  In a minority of cases (including
Colombia, Guatemala and the Philippines) the government 
is represented on the decision-making body.  In other cases, 
a member of government attends as an observer, without 
the right to vote (Hungary, Romania, Turkey and the
United Kingdom).
(1) After using headline CPI for the period 1998–99.
(2) The RBA looks at a range of measures of underlying inflation, but its preferred
measures are trimmed mean measures which, while downweighting the effect of large
changes in fuel and food do not exclude them.  In the Czech Republic the core
measure is a measure of monetary policy relevant inflation, ie headline inflation
adjusted for first round effects of changes in indirect taxes.
(3) Sweden dropped the tolerance bands around its point target in 2010.
(4) In the United Kingdom there is a requirement if inflation is more than 1 percentage
point away from target for the Bank of England to write an open letter.  But this is an
accountability mechanism and not a target range.Handbook No. 29 State of the art of inflation targeting 11
Decision-making process
A majority of inflation targeters — 18 of the 26 — determine
monetary policy by majority vote, rather than arriving at a
consensus decision.(1) The Governor, as chairperson, usually
has the casting vote.  Eight central banks arrive at a consensus
decision, and in New Zealand the Governor is the sole
decision-maker (Charts 3 and 4).
Frequency of decision-making
Most decision-making bodies meet between eight and 
twelve times per year.  Monthly meetings are common, and fit
well with the monthly release of data.  In normal times,
six-weekly meetings are usually sufficient to take account of
the news.  In exceptional times, the committee may meet
more frequently.  In our sample, fourteen central banks meet
11–12 times per year and ten meet 8–9 times per year, while in
Ghana, Norway, SouthAfrica and Sweden the MPC meets six
times per year.
Models and forecasts
Models used for monetary policy
Inflation targeting requires strong technical capacity in the
central bank to model the economy, understand the
transmission mechanism and forecast inflation and output.
Most inflation-targeting central banks use a suite of models
approach (Table C), including statistical and spreadsheet
forecasts, structural, macroeconomic and dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models.  Some models are
theoretically based, while others are more data driven.  Some
Table B Decision-making in inflation-targeting central banks
Number on policy External members? Meetings per year Governor’s term Decision making Votes published?
making committee (years) process
Armenia 7 No 12 6 Vote No
Australia 9 6 11 7 Consensus n/a
Brazil 8 No 8 No fixed term Vote Balance of votes
Canada 6 No 8 7 Consensus n/a
Chile 5 No 12 5 Vote Yes
Colombia 7 No 12 4 Vote Majority or unanimous
Czech Republic 7 No 8 6 Vote Yes
Ghana 7 2 6 4 Consensus n/a
Guatemala 8 7 8 4 Vote No
Hungary 5 to 9(a) 4 12 6 Vote Yes
Iceland 5 2 8 5 Consensus otherwise vote Balance of votes
Indonesia 6 to 9(b) No 12 5 Consensus n/a
Israel 6 3 12 5 Vote Balance of votes
Mexico 5 No 8 6 Consensus n/a
New Zealand Governor n/a 8 5 Governor decides n/a
Norway 7 5 6 6 Consensus n/a
Peru 7 No 12 Term of parliament Vote No
Philippines 7 No 8 6 Vote No
Poland 10 9 12 6 Vote Yes in Inflation Report
Romania 9 5 8 5 Vote No
Serbia 5 No 12 6 Vote No
South Africa 7 No 6 5 Consensus n/a
South Korea 7 5 12 4 Vote No
Sweden 6 No 6 6 Vote Yes
Thailand 7 4 8 5 Vote Balance of votes
Turkey 7 1 12 5 Vote No
United Kingdom 9 4 12 5 Vote Yes
(a) Currently 7.
(b) Currently 7.
(1) In Iceland, the committee attempts to arrive at a consensus, but if not, will vote.12 Handbook No. 29  State of the art of inflation targeting
are better suited to short-term projections and others for
longer-term forecast horizons.  By using a suite of different
models, central banks can draw both on theory and data,
plus, of course, a large element of judgment, to inform
policymaking.
Spreadsheet forecasts are typically used to make monthly
projections of CPI over the near term (up to six months).  They
can incorporate information (eg on administered prices) and
expert judgement on the individual components of CPI.
Small-scale econometric models such as vector
autoregressions (VARs) and error correction models use
information in macroeconomic data to project future
developments and tend to be used for projections six to twelve
months ahead.  The usefulness of these models depends on the
quality of the data;  they are less useful when there has been
rapid transformation in the economy such that the past is a
less reliable guide to the future.(1)
Small structural models, typically of four to six equations, have
some theoretical underpinning, are tractable for forecasting
purposes and also have some empirical basis.  In recent years
many central banks have added a DSGE model to their suite.
These models have strong microfoundations(2) and are among
the most theoretically coherent of models.  Another big
advantage is that they include forward-looking behaviour,
especially forward-looking inflation expectations, which as we
have seen is a key variable for inflation targeters.  DSGE
models are complex to build, however, and often need to be
augmented with a number of ad hocfeatures in order to
replicate stylised facts in the data.
Forecasts
All inflation targeters publish their forecasts of inflation,
usually quarterly.  Eight central banks (Australia, Canada,
Ghana, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Romania and Thailand) also
publish forecasts of core inflation.  16 publish GDP forecasts,
and Norway and Romania publish forecasts of the output gap.
A few central banks (the Czech Republic, Israel, New Zealand,
Norway and Sweden) now publish projections for the policy
interest rate.(3)
There are a number of separate issues here.  The first is 
what broad type of interest rate assumption (constant or 
non-constant) is better for forecasting.  Then there is the
question of whether the time-varying path that is an input to
the forecast should be model-based, market-based or based on
judgement.  Finally there is a separate question of
communication.  The question of how much a central bank
should reveal about its expectations of future policy rates has
been the subject of considerable debate.
There are a number of arguments in favour of a central bank
publishing its own projection of interest rates.  First, it can be
seen as an extension of the transparent inflation-targeting
framework.  This will help anchor inflation expectations.
Kahn (2007) argued that publishing the central bank’s
projections for interest rates may help markets price assets
more efficiently, and Sellon (2008) found that in the
United States, more explicit guidance on interest rates led to
an improvement in private sector forecasts.  Rosenberg (2008)
found that in Sweden, the publication of the Executive Board’s
projection for the policy rate resulted in the Board being more
involved in the forecast process.
There are equally powerful arguments against publishing the
central bank’s projection for policy rates.  First, most central
banks don’t actually have a path to communicate.  Many MPCs
spend most of their time assessing the economic situation and
outlook rather than the future path of interest rates.
Goodhart (2001) makes a convincing argument on the
(1) In econometrics terms, where there are structural breaks in the data.
(2) Microfounded models include microeconomic analysis of the behaviour of individual
agents such as households and firms to underpin the macroeconomic theory.
(3) Since January 2009, the Czech National Bank has also published projections for the
exchange rate.  In January 2012, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York adopted an
inflation goal of 2% and published forecasts for federal funds rate, though it did not
formally adopt inflation targeting.  
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Table C Models and forecasts
Type of models Published forecasts Interest rate assumption Forecast owned by
Armenia  Core medium-term projection Inflation and GDP fan charts Constant Central bank
model, short-term forecasting 
models, signal extraction models, 
satellite models
Australia DSGE plus small models and  GDP, inflation and core inflation Market or constant  Central bank
single equations
Brazil VARs, small and medium-sized  Fan chart forecasts of inflation  Constant and market MPC
macro models, DSGE and GDP
Canada Suite of DSGE plus macro models  GDP, inflation and core inflation Endogenous Governing Council
Chile Quarterly macroeconomic model,  GDP and CPI Consistent with the target Board
time series and DSGE
Colombia Models for statistical forecasting,  Fan chart forecast of inflation and  Policy rule Staff
structural and simulation purposes range forecast of GDP
Czech Republic DSGE macro model Inflation, monetary policy relevant Endogenous Central bank
inflation, interest rate, exchange rate 
and GDP
Ghana AR, ECM, (macro and calibrated  Headline and core inflation and GDP Not communicated MPC
models being developed)
Guatemala ARIMA;  smoothing model and a  Inflation Non-constant path Staff
semi-structural macro model
Hungary Time series, expert, macro and  CPI, core inflation, GDP and labour  Endogenous Staff
DSGE market
Iceland VAR, structural, macro, (DSGE  Inflation Generated from macro model Staff
being developed)
Indonesia DSGE, macro, ARIMA Inflation, GDP and GDP components Scenarios and expected inflation Board
Israel Suite of models Fan chart forecasts for inflation and key  Forward-looking policy reaction  Staff
policy rate.  Range forecast for GDP function — endogenous 
Mexico DSGE model, ECM Inflation, GDP and employment  Endogenous Staff
New Zealand Calibrated gaps model is main GDP, inflation and interest rate  Endogenous MPC
forecasting model.  Suite of projections
alternative models.   
Norway DSGE models and a suite of  Key policy rate, output gap, CPI and  Endogenous Governor
forecasting models for ‘nowcasting’ core inflation
Peru Semi-structural, DSGE, VAR Inflation, GDP, BoP, inflation and  Taylor rule Central bank
GDP in trading partners
Philippines Single equation, multi equation,  Inflation Constant Central bank
(macro models being developed, 
DSGE model for policy simulation)
Poland Suite of macroeconomic models;  Inflation and core inflation,  Constant Staff
structural macro model is main one. GDP and GDP components 
DSGE model used for internal analysis
Romania Semi-structural model,  Inflation, core inflation and GDP gap Model-based monetary policy  Board
timeseries models reaction function (Taylor rule)
Serbia Quarterly Projection Model Inflation Endogenous Executive Board
South Africa Core macro forecasting plus suite  Fan chart forecast of Inflation Constant MPC
of models and GDP
South Korea Dynamic Projection Model,  Inflation and GDP Market Central bank
DSGE model
Sweden Time series model, indicator models,  GDP, CPI, core inflation and the  Endogenous Board
structural models (eg DSGE) repo rate
Thailand Suite of models ( DSGE being  Core inflation and GDP Constant MPC
developed)
Turkey Quarterly Forecast Model  Inflation, core inflation and Endogenous MPC
(DSGE model being developed) output gap
United Kingdom Statistical and theoretical.   Inflation and GDP Market rates MPC
Main forecasting model is  DSGE14 Handbook No. 29  State of the art of inflation targeting
practical difficulty for a committee, particularly an
individualistic committee, agreeing on an entire path for
interest rates:  do members vote for each month’s decision?
how then to aggregate these views?  King (2007) suggested
that markets need information on the MPC’s contingent
response to data as they evolve, rather than the MPC’s
projections of the policy rate.  On a different tack, Kahn (2007)
suggests that policymakers may feel tied in to a published
projection and be less willing to change path in response to
new information.
For some central banks, the key arguments against publishing
a projection of the policy rate relate to the communication
strategy, rather than technical factors.  A real issue is whether
markets, and more especially the general public, would
understand the conditional nature of the interest rate
projection, particularly as the central bank itself sets the policy
rate.  There is also the argument that publishing the policy rate
projection could unhelpfully move the debate into aspects of
forecasting and the interest rate path and away from the
central message that the central bank wants to convey about
meeting the inflation target.
A separate question is who owns the inflation forecast.  The
more clearly the policymaking body is seen to be associated
with the forecast, the more directly it will be perceived as
having an influence on policy.  In general, decision-makers in
inflation-targeting central banks tend to be very involved with
the forecast:  in fourteen cases the forecast is owned by the
Board or MPC;(1) in six cases it is a central bank forecast and in
seven cases a staff forecast.
Accountability and transparency
Mechanisms of accountability
There is a large literature on the relationship between central
bank independence and accountability.  Individual
inflation-targeting frameworks often reflect strenuous
attempts to balance the two, with detailed and sophisticated
mechanisms to hold the central bank to account for its
conduct of monetary policy.  For the United Kingdom,
Tucker (2007) details the reforms that were necessary in the
early 1990s to ensure independence and accountability for the
Bank of England, particularly given a prevailing view that ‘it
was a real obstacle to independence that the Bank would not
be able to account for its monetary stewardship on the Floor
of the House of Commons.  In a Parliamentary system of
democracy, it is Ministers who are accountable’.  Similarly
Reddell (2006) reveals the detailed monitoring system, both
statutory and as it has evolved in practice, for the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand.  The legislation establishes clear roles
for the Governor, the Minister of Finance and the Board of
Directors under the Policy Target Agreement.  The Board’s role
includes monitoring the role of the Governor who is formally
held to account for the conduct of monetary policy.(2)
Specific forms of accountability to parliament have been put in
place in inflation-targeting regimes, notably ‘open letters’ and
parliamentary hearings.  Open letters are usually letters
written by the Governor on behalf of the MPC to the
government in the event that inflation misses the inflation
target by a pre-specified amount.  The central bank is usually
required to explain why inflation has missed the target, what
action the central bank is taking to bring inflation back to
target and when this is expected to happen.  The open letter is
designed to be part of the communication and accountability
process, and not a ‘censure’ on the central bank.  When the
original framework for the Bank of England was put in place in
1997, it included a requirement for an open letter if inflation
deviated from target by more than 1 percentage point in either
direction.  At the time, it was expected, on the basis of
previous volatility in inflation, that an open letter would be
required about 40% of the time (Bean (1998)).  In the event,
the volatility of inflation fell markedly and it took ten years
before the first open letter was written in April 2007.  Among
our sample, seven central banks have an open letter as part of
their accountability mechanisms(3) (Chart 5).
Another important accountability mechanism is
parliamentary hearings, whereby the central bank appears
before parliament to provide testimony on monetary policy.
All industrialised countries, but only one half of emerging and
developing countries have some form of parliamentary
hearing as part of their inflation-targeting framework
(Chart 5).
Open letters and parliamentary hearings are the main forms of
accountability to parliament.  There are also accountability
mechanisms that hold the governor or MPC accountable to the
(1) This includes Norway where the Governor is ultimately responsible for the forecast.
(2) Reddell makes clear that ‘the Act does not allow the Governor to be dismissed simply
for failing to meet the policy targets.  The criteria in the Act refer explicitly to the
performance of the Bank and the Governor in pursuit of those targets’.
(3) In addition, New Zealand and Israel have other, similar accountability mechanisms.
Chart 5 Accountability mechanisms
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central bank Board and the central bank is ultimately
accountable to the public.  Public accountability is usually
achieved through publications and the wider communication
strategy.
Publications and communications
‘Inflation targeting is a framework for making and
communicating decisions.’  King (2005) op cit.
For central banks planning to introduce inflation targeting,
establishing a strategic communications strategy is a key
pre-requisite.  Communication is an integral part of an
inflation-targeting framework.  Since the early 1990s, all
central banks have become more transparent, as openness has
replaced mystique as a guide to monetary policy, but inflation
targeters are the most transparent (Geraats (2009)).  Dincer
and Eichengreen (2007) find that in their sample of 100 central
banks the most transparent were the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand, the Swedish Riksbank, the Bank of England, the Czech
National Bank, the Bank of Canada, the ECB, and the Central
Bank of the Philippines.
There has been some convergence on central bank
communication.  Most central banks communicate their
monetary policy framework and objectives.  Most publish their
analysis of economic conditions, including the outlook for
Table D Accountability and transparency
Open Parliamentary Press notice/ Minutes Votes Inflation Frequency
letter hearings? conference Report
Armenia No Yes, annual PR Yes, within ten days No Yes 4
Australia No Yes, twice yearly Notice Yes, after two weeks n/a Yes 4
Brazil Yes Yes, six per year PR + PC for IR Yes, after eight days Balance of votes Yes 4
Canada No Yes, twice yearly PR + PC for IR No n/a Yes 4
Chile No Yes, four times per year PR Yes, after two weeks Yes Yes 4
Colombia No Yes, twice yearly PR, PC for IR Yes, after two weeks Majority or unanimous Yes 4
Czech Republic No No (Report) PR, PC for IR Yes, after eight days Yes Yes 4
Ghana No No PR + PC No n/a Yes 4 to 6
Guatemala No Yes, twice a year PR + PC Yes, after four weeks No Yes 3
Hungary No Yes, once a year PC Yes Yes Yes 4
Iceland Yes Yes, twice yearly PR + PC Yes Balance of votes Yes 2 plus 2
Indonesia No No PR No n/a Yes 4
Israel No Yes, twice yearly PR Yes, after two weeks Balance of votes Yes 2
Mexico No Yes, not regular PR Yes, after two weeks n/a Yes 4
New Zealand Other Yes, four times a year PR, PC for IR No n/a Yes 4
Norway No Yes PR + PC No n/a Yes 3
Peru No Yes, once a year Teleconference No No Yes 4
Philippines Yes No PR + PC Yes, after four weeks No Yes 4
Poland No No(a) PR + PC Yes, after three weeks Yes in IR Yes 4
Romania No No PR + PC for IR No No Yes 4
Serbia Yes No(b) PR + PC No No Yes 4
South Africa No Yes, at least three per year PR + PC No n/a Yes 2
South Korea No Yes PR + PC Yes, after six weeks No Yes 2
Sweden No Yes, twice yearly PR Yes, after two weeks Yes Yes 3 plus 3
Thailand Yes No PR + PC Yes, after two weeks Balance of votes Yes 4
Turkey Yes Yes, twice a year PR Yes No Yes 4
United Kingdom Yes Yes, three per year PR + PC for IR Yes, after two weeks Yes Yes 4
Note:
IR = Inflation Report.
PC = Press conference.
PR = Press release.
(a) Governor reports to Lower House once a year on monetary policy in the preceding year.  
(b) Governor explains reports to National Assembly.  See page 38.16 Handbook No. 29  State of the art of inflation targeting
growth and inflation, as well as the major risks to that
outlook. And most central banks explain the reasons for their
policy decision.  The main differences in communication
strategy lie in how much information is revealed about
differences of opinion among decision-makers, and how much
guidance, either explicit or implicit, is given about the future
stance of policy (see the section on forecasts for a discussion
on publishing a projection for policy rates).
For inflation targeters, the main vehicle of communication is
the Inflation Report.  All 27 publish such a report, in the vast
majority of cases quarterly (Table D).  The Inflation Report
usually presents the central bank’s assessment of economic
conditions and its view on prospects for inflation and growth,
including its projections for these and other variables.  The
main upside and downside risks to the projections and
alternative scenarios are often included (see Table C for details
of published projections).  The other main purpose of the
Inflation Report is to explain the rationale behind recent
monetary policy decisions.
Another important publication is the minutes of the
policymaking meeting.  Eighteen inflation targeters publish the
minutes, usually after a lag of two to four weeks, though the
Central Bank of Brazil and the Czech National Bank publish
minutes eight days after the policy meeting.  As Chart 6
shows, most but not all industrialised countries publish
minutes,(1) and publication of minutes is becoming more
common in emerging market countries, with two thirds now
publishing minutes of the policy meeting.(2)
Inflation targeters in Europe are the most individualistic:  of
the 18 central banks that reach an interest rate decision by
vote, six publish the individual votes;  Chile, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland,(3) Sweden and the United Kingdom.  Brazil,
Iceland and Thailand reveal the balance of the vote, and
Colombia reveals whether there was a unanimous or majority
decision.
One reason for publishing individual votes is that this gives the
markets more information on the policymakers’ views.  In the
Bank of England, revealing individual votes also accords with
the principle of individual accountability among MPC
members.  Publishing the balance of votes is an alternative
way of providing information about the views on the
committee without revealing the identities of voters.  One
argument for not revealing individual votes is that it may make
it easier for members to change their position.  Since details of
the vote contain market sensitive information there is an
argument for publishing it when the interest rate decision is
announced, rather than subsequently when the minutes are
published.
All inflation targeters publish details of the monetary policy
decision (usually the interest rate) immediately after the
policy meeting, and it is usual for a press release or notice to
accompany the decision (Table D).  In addition, 19 inflation
targeters hold press conferences, either to explain the decision
or on publication of the Inflation Report.
Challenges for inflation targeting
Inflation targeting has been in existence for just over 20 years.
During that time, frameworks have evolved, as has economic
theory and consensus views on the objectives of monetary
policy.  The introduction of inflation targeting in many
countries coincided with the ‘great stability’, a period
characterised by moderate consumer price inflation and a
reduction in the volatility of inflation and output.  Following
the financial crisis that started in 2007, inflation targeters (and
indeed all monetary policy makers) faced new and
unprecedented challenges.
Inflation targeting and financial stability
A key issue for central banks has been how to combine the
goal of financial stability with the goal of price stability.  It is
clear that low and stable inflation does not guarantee financial
stability.  While there have been few changes to central banks’
formal inflation-targeting frameworks, the role of financial
stability has been strengthened in central banks, with some,
like the Bank of England, introducing a new macroprudential
policy framework to strengthen financial stability alongside
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Sources:  Bank of England and other central bank websites.
(1) In New Zealand, where the decision is taken by the governor, it does not make sense
to publish minutes as such.  In Australia, five of the external members are from the
business community, and publication of voting records could subject them to pressure
from that sector.
(2) Thailand and Mexico began publishing minutes in 2010.
(3) In the Inflation Report, rather than the minutes.Handbook No. 29 State of the art of inflation targeting 17
Inflation targeting and asset prices
While inflation targeting generally resulted in low and stable
consumer prices in the 1990s and early part of the 2000s,
asset prices were more volatile, and there were long-standing
concerns about the build-up of money and credit in some
economies.  Against this background, a key issue facing central
banks for some years has been whether and how they should
take account of asset prices in monetary policy (see for
example Borio and White (2004)).  On the specific question of
how inflation targeters should respond to asset prices,
Bean (2003) noted that ‘a central bank seeking to stabilise
inflation and output over a sufficiently long time horizon
should necessarily aim to incorporate the possible adverse
long term consequences of an asset price bubble in its
deliberations’.  This implies taking a longer time horizon for
monetary policy decisions, beyond the one or two year
horizon.  For several years central banks such as the RBA have
argued that central banks need to pay close attention to asset
prices;  what information they may contain about the stance
of policy and the risks that may be building up.  In Poland, 
the Monetary Policy Guidelines for 2010 issued by the
National Bank contain more explicit acknowledgement of
asset prices in interest rate setting.  
The financial crisis has challenged the conventional wisdom
that monetary policy could not and should not attempt to
burst asset price bubbles, but rather should be used
energetically in the aftermath of the bubble bursting.  Yet
there is still no clear consensus on how proactively central
banks should lean against the wind.  
Specification of the inflation target
The increased volatility in inflation since 2007 has led to some
debate on the best target measure of inflation.  There have
been calls for the targets to explicitly include asset prices and
particularly house prices.  Others have argued in favour of
targeting ‘domestically generated inflation’, in order to
abstract from the headwinds and tailwinds of imported
inflation.  The fear of deflation led some to propose increasing
the level of the target in order to avoid the zero bound.  Others
have suggested that, faced with below target inflation in the
short run, the inflation target should be specified as an average
over several years in order to anchor inflation expectations.
Some have argued that this makes more sense with a price
level target, and that a price level target would provide a
stronger anchor for positive inflation expectations.  On the
other hand, there are concerns that a price level target would
be less effective in coping with persistent terms of trade
stocks.
Inflation targeting near the zero bound
The traditional instrument of monetary policy is interest rates.
In 2009 and 2010, several central banks had reduced interest
rates close to zero.  Interest rates cannot usually be negative,
so as further easing of monetary policy was required in order
to achieve the inflation target, central banks used
‘unconventional monetary policy’.  This usually involves
measures to increase the quantity of money or credit in the
economy to provide an additional stimulus to nominal
spending in order to meet the inflation target.  In these
operations, the central bank buys public and private sector
assets using central bank money.
Some inflation-targeting central banks pursued
unconventional monetary policies.  The Bank of England began
a programme of asset purchases in March 2009,(1) and the
Bank of Canada published a framework for unconventional
monetary policy under inflation targeting in their April 2009
Monetary Report, under which it made a conditional
commitment to keep policy rates at the effective lower band
until the second quarter of 2010.  One benefit of the 
inflation-targeting framework is that monetary policy
decisions are clearly linked to the inflation target.  The inflation
forecast provides a guide for the extent of quantitative easing
that may be necessary and also the appropriate time to exit.
The numerical target also provides a strong anchor for inflation
expectations.  
Conclusion
Inflation targeting has been successfully practised in a 
growing number of countries in the past twenty years.  This
Handbook presents the main features of the frameworks in
place in the 27 countries regarded as fully fledged inflation
targeters at the beginning of 2012.  There is much common
ground among inflation targeters, but nonetheless individual
frameworks reflect local economic, political and cultural
factors.  Inflation-targeting frameworks have also been
adapted to meet with new challenges.  It is likely that further
changes will occur as central banks seek to combine their
financial stability objectives with the monetary policy
objectives.
(1) The programme paused in February 2010 after a total of £200 billion of asset
purchases but was resumed in October 2011 when a further £75 billion of asset
purchases was announced.  18 Handbook No. 29  State of the art of inflation targeting
Armenia 
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority Central Bank of Armenia (CBA).
1.2 Legal mandate Armenian Law on ‘The Central Bank’ specifies that its key objective is ensuring price stability.
1.3 Operational independence? Yes.
1.4 Date IT adopted January 2006.
1.5 Who sets the target? CBA jointly with the Government. 
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? Headline CPI.
1.7 Current target 4% ±1.5 percentage points.
1.8 Target horizon Twelve months.
1.9 Key policy rate One week repo rate.
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body CBA Board:  Governor, Vice Governor, five Board members.
2.2 External members? No.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members The Governor is appointed by the National Assembly for six years, the Vice Governor is 
appointed by the President for six years and five Board members are appointed by the President 
for five years on a rotating schedule.  
2.4 Decision-making process A technical committee including the Board member responsible for monetary policy makes 
recommendations to the Board.  The Board makes decisions based on majority voting.  The 
Governor has a casting vote.  
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting Monthly.
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank Core medium-term projection model, short-term forecasting models, signal extraction models, 
satellite models.  
3.2 Published forecasts Inflation and GDP fan charts.
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates Constant interest rates.
3.4 Forecast owned by CBA.
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter No.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings Once a year.
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Press release.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision Press release.
5.3 Publication of minutes Within ten days after decision.
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes No.
5.5 Inflation Report Yes.
5.6 Frequency Quarterly Monetary Programmes andInflation Report.Handbook No. 29 State of the art of inflation targeting 19
Australia
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA).
1.2 Legal mandate The mandate is set out in Section 10 (2) of the Reserve Bank Act 1959:  
‘to ensure that the monetary and banking policy… will best contribute to:
a)  the stability of the currency;
b)  the maintenance of full employment;  and
c)  the economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia’.
1.3 Operational independence? Yes.
1.4 Date IT adopted June 1993.
1.5 Who sets the target? Government and central bank.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? CPI.  Initially a measure of underlying inflation but since 1998, headline CPI.
1.7 Current target Target range of 2%–3% per annum on average over the economic cycle.
1.8 Target horizon Medium term.
1.9 Key policy rate Cash rate (overnight loans between financial intermediaries).
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body Reserve Bank Board.
There are nine members — three ex officio;  the Governor (chairperson), Deputy Governor, and 
the Secretary to the Treasury together with six external members.
2.2 External members? Yes.  Six external members who are appointed by the Treasurer.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members The Governor and Deputy Governor are appointed by the Governor-General in Council for terms 
of up to seven years and can be re-appointed.  Their appointments can be terminated only with 
the approval of each House of Parliament in the same session of Parliament.
The six external members are appointed by the Treasurer for terms of up to five years and are 
eligible for re-appointment.
2.4 Decision-making process In the Act, majority vote.  The chairperson has a casting vote.
In practice, the Board usually achieves a consensus without the need for formal voting.
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting Normally eleven times each year (not January).
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank Forecasts reflect a mix of judgement and models (DSGE plus small models and single equations).
3.2 Published forecasts Forecasts for GDP, inflation and underlying inflation are published four times a year.
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates As specified:  typically that the cash rate is either constant or moves broadly in line with market 
expectations.  
3.4 Forecast owned by RBA (forecasts are ‘RBA’ documents not Board documents).
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter No.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings Yes.  The Governor and senior officers appear twice yearly before the House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Economics.
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes, with a media release.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision Press notice.
5.3 Publication of minutes Yes, two weeks after each meeting.
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes No.
5.5 Inflation Report Statement on Monetary Policy.
5.6 Frequency Four times a year.20 Handbook No. 29  State of the art of inflation targeting
Brazil
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority Central Bank of Brazil.
1.2 Legal mandate Decree no. 3088, 21 June, 1999 formally instituted the inflation-targeting regime in Brazil.
1.3 Operational independence? Yes.
1.4 Date IT adopted June 1999.
1.5 Who sets the target? The National Monetary Council (CMN).
This consists of:  the Minister of Finance;  the Governor of the Central Bank of Brazil;  and the 
Minister of Planning, Budget and Management.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? Headline Broad National Consumer Price Index (IPCA).
1.7 Current target Point target with tolerance intervals.
Target for 2012 and 2013:  4.5% ±2 percentage points.
The target for 2014 will be set in June 2012.  
1.8 Target horizon Yearly target.
1.9 Key policy rate SELIC;  an overnight interest rate.
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body Monetary Policy Committee (COPOM).
There are eight members:  the Central Bank’s Board of Directors:  the Governor and the 
Deputy-Governors of Monetary Policy, Economic Policy, International Affairs and Risk 
Management, Financial Regulation, Financial System Organisation and control of farm credit, 
Supervision and Administration.
2.2 External members? No.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members The Governor and all Deputy Governors of the Central Bank are appointed by the President of 
the Republic prior to approval by the Senate.  There is no fixed term of appointment for the 
Governor and Deputy Governors.  
2.4 Decision-making process By vote.  The Governor has a casting vote.
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting Eight meetings per year.
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank VARs, Bayesian VAR, VECM, FAVAR, small and medium sized macro models and a DSGE model.
3.2 Published forecasts Fan chart forecasts of inflation and GDP are published quarterly.
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates Benchmark scenario using constant interest rates, and market scenario using market expected 
interest rate.
3.4 Forecast owned by Monetary Policy Committee.
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter Yes, in case of non-fulfilment of the inflation target, the Governor must write an open letter to 
the Minister of Finance setting out the reasons for missing the target, the policy measures to 
guarantee the return of the inflation rate to the tolerance interval, and the expected time horizon 
for these measures to become effective.  
4.2 Parliamentary hearings Yes, six times per year.
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision No, only after the publication of the Inflation Report.
5.3 Publication of minutes Yes, eight days after each meeting.
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes Balance of votes.
5.5 Inflation Report Yes.
5.6 Frequency Four per year.Handbook No. 29 State of the art of inflation targeting 21
Canada
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority Bank of Canada.
1.2 Legal mandate According to the Bank of Canada Act the main role is ‘to promote the economic and financial 
welfare of Canada’.
1.3 Operational independence? Yes.
1.4 Date IT adopted  February 1991.
1.5 Who sets the target? Bank of Canada and the Government of Canada.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? Headline CPI.
Core inflation used as operational guide.
Target is defined in terms of the twelve-month rate of change in total CPI.
1.7 Current target 2%, the mid-point of the 1%–3% range.
Aim at 2% usually over six to eight quarters, but this is flexible.  
1.8 Target horizon Inflation-control target agreement with government renewed for five years until December 2016
1.9 Key policy rate  Overnight rate.
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body Governing Council.
There are six members:  the Governor, Senior Deputy Governor and four Deputy Governors.
2.2 External members? No.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members The Governor and Senior Deputy Governor are appointed by the Bank’s Board of Directors (with 
the approval of Cabinet) for terms of seven years. 
2.4 Decision-making process By consensus.
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting In normal conditions, eight times a year.
3 Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank TOTEM (open-economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model) is used as the main 
projection model for the Canadian economy.
MUSE is the main forecast model of the US economy.
BoC-GEM (Bank of Canada Global Economic Model) is the dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model that is used to assess the effects of global shocks on major countries or 
economic regions and their impact on Canada.
BoC-GEM-Fin is the version of BoC-GEM that includes financial frictions and a banking sector. 
The Global Projection Model is used to forecast the rest of the world economy.
3.2 Published forecasts Fan chart forecasts for total and core inflation plus GDP forecasts.
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates Endogenous.  Path of the policy rate required to achieve the inflation target.  
3.4 Forecast owned by The Governing Council.
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter No.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings Yes.
The Bank’s Annual Report is presented to Parliament by the Minister and a copy is also published 
in the Canada Gazette.
The Governor/Senior Deputy Governor testify before Parliament/Senate twice a year after the 
release of the Monetary Policy Report.
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision Press release eight times a year.  There is a press conference the following the release of the 
Monetary Policy Reportfour times a year.
5.3 Publication of minutes No.
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes n/a.
5.5 Inflation Report Monetary Policy Report.
5.6 Frequency Four times a year.22 Handbook No. 29  State of the art of inflation targeting
Chile
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority Central Bank of Chile.
1.2 Legal mandate According to Article 97 of Chapter XII of the current Constitution of Chile, the central bank 
mandate is ‘to ensure the stability of the value of the national currency and the normal 
functioning of domestic and foreign payments’.
1.3 Operational independence? Yes.
1.4 Date IT adopted September 1999.
1.5 Who sets the target? Central Bank of Chile.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? Annual CPI (headline).
1.7 Current target Point target of 3% ±1 percentage point.
1.8 Target horizon Around two years.
1.9 Key policy rate Monetary policy interest rate (MPR) an overnight interbank rate.
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body The Board of the Central Bank of Chile.
There are five members — the Governor, Deputy Governor and three other members.
2.2 External members? No.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members Appointed by the President and approved by Senate.
Appointments are made every two years and last for ten years.  Members can be re-appointed for 
another period of the same duration.  The Governor is appointed by the President of Chile from 
among the Board members for a period of five years, or the lesser remaining period in her or his 
term as Board member.  The Board itself elects the Vice Governor from among its members.
2.4 Decision-making process By vote.  Governor has a casting vote.
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting Monthly.
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank Quarterly macroeconomic model, time series and DSGE.
3.2 Published forecasts GDP and CPI with some breakdowns.
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates The path of the MPR must be consistent with the target.  The communications state whether 
the path is steeper or flatter than private sector expectations.
3.4 Forecast owned by The Board.
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter No.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings Four times per year.  One with the full Senate and the other three usually only with the 
Finance Committee.
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes, with a press release.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision Press release.
5.3 Publication of minutes Yes, two weeks after the meeting.
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes Yes.
5.5 Inflation Report Monetary Policy Report.
5.6 Frequency Four times a year.Handbook No. 29 State of the art of inflation targeting 23
Colombia
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority Banco de la República.
1.2 Legal mandate According to article 373, subsection 1 of the National Constitution and Law 31,1992, article 2, 
‘to achieve the State’s objective of maintaining currency purchasing power’.
1.3 Operational independence? Yes.
1.4 Date IT adopted October 1999.
1.5 Who sets the target? The Board of Directors.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? Headline CPI.
1.7 Current target 2011:  a range of 2% to 4% with the mid-point 3% for legal purposes.
1.8 Target horizon Yearly target by law.  Central bank announced a long-term target range of 2%–4%.  Maximum 
impact of policy rates on inflation is 18 months.
1.9 Key policy rate Intervention interest rate (but other instruments also used).
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body Board of Directors.
There are seven members — the Minister of Finance, the Governor and five Co-Directors.
2.2 External members? No.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members Full-time members and the Governor are appointed for fixed periods of four years, twice 
renewable.
The President replaces two of the full-time members every four years, halfway through the 
presidential period.
2.4 Decision-making process By vote, on a one person one vote basis.
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting Monthly.
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank The bank uses a wide variety of models with diverse foci (statistical and forecasting, structural 
and simulation).
3.2 Published forecasts Fan chart forecast of inflation and range forecast of GDP published in the Inflation Report.
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates Policy rule.
3.4 Forecast owned by Staff.
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter No.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings The Board presents a twice-yearly report to the Colombian Congress on the economy’s 
performance and prospects.
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes, with a press release.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision Yes.  Two weeks after the quarterly Inflation Report, the Governor presents on national 
television and takes questions from the public, live.
5.3 Publication of minutes Yes, two weeks after the meeting.
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes Indicates whether the decision is by majority vote or unanimous.
5.5 Inflation Report Yes.
5.6 Frequency Four times a year.24 Handbook No. 29  State of the art of inflation targeting
Czech Republic
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority Czech National Bank (CNB).
1.2 Legal mandate Act on the Czech National Bank, December 1992 states that the primary objective of CNB 
‘Shall be to maintain price stability’.  Without prejudice to this, CNB ‘shall support the 
general economic policies of the Government leading to sustainable economic growth’.
1.3 Operational independence? Yes.
1.4 Date IT adopted December 1997.
1.5 Who sets the target? CNB.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? Headline CPI (since January 2002).
1.7 Current target Point target of 2% ±1 percentage point (from January 2010).
1.8 Target horizon Medium term, 12–18 months. 




2.1 Decision-making body CNB Bank Board.
There are seven members:  the Governor, two Vice Governors and four Chief Executive 
Directors.
2.2 External members? No.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members Members are appointed for a six-year term and cannot hold the position more than twice.
Appointed and relieved from office by the President of the Republic.
2.4 Decision-making process Majority voting.  Chairperson has a casting vote.
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting Eight times a year.
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank Core medium-term prediction model is a DSGE macro model;  ‘g3’.
3.2 Published forecasts Fan chart forecasts for headline inflation, monetary policy relevant inflation (headline inflation
adjusted for first round effects of changes in indirect taxes), interest rate, exchange rate and GDP.
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates Endogenous.
3.4 Forecast owned by CNB.
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter No.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings The Czech National Bank submits a report on monetary development to the Chamber of 
Deputies of Parliament at least twice a year.
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes, with a press release.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision Press conference.
5.3 Publication of minutes Yes, eight days after each meeting.
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes Balance of votes published at press conference.  Individual votes published in the minutes.
5.5 Inflation Report Yes.
5.6 Frequency Four times per year.Handbook No. 29 State of the art of inflation targeting 25
Ghana
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority Bank of Ghana.
1.2 Legal mandate Bank of Ghana Act 2002:
‘The primary objective of the Bank is to maintain stability in the general level of prices.  
Without prejudice to the above, the Bank shall support the general economic policy of the 
Government and promote economic growth and effective and efficient operation of banking 
and credit systems in the country, independent of instructions from the Government or any 
other authority.’
1.3 Operational independence? Yes.
1.4 Date IT adopted Informally in 2002, formally from May 2007.
1.5 Who sets the target? Government and central bank.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? Headline CPI.
1.7 Current target 2012:  8.7% ±2 percentage points.
2013:  8.0% ±2 percentage points.
1.8 Target horizon 18–24 months.
1.9 Key policy rate Prime Rate.
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body By law, proposals are initiated by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), while the Board of 
Directors is formally responsible for monetary policy decisions.
In practice, the monetary policy decisions taken by the MPC have never to date been reversed 
by the Board.
The Board consists of twelve members:  the Governor as chairman, the First and Second 
Deputy Governors and nine Directors.  One of the nine Directors is a representative of the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning.  The Secretary of the Bank also attends.
The MPC consists of seven members:  the Governor, the two deputy Governors, the heads 
of monetary policy analysis and banking department and two external members.
2.2 External members? The two external members are appointed by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members The Governor and the Deputy Governors are appointed by the President in consultation with 
the Council of State for a four-year term and can be re-appointed.
Board members are appointed for three years and are eligible for re-appointment.
2.4 Decision-making process By consensus.
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting Six times a year.
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank Autoregressive (AR) forecasting model;  error correction forecasting model;  macro econometric 
model and calibrated macroeconomic model (being developed).
3.2 Published forecasts Fan chart forecasts for headline and core inflation and GDP are published in the Monetary Policy 
Report.
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates Not communicated.
3.4 Forecast owned by MPC.
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter No.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings No.  However, by law, the Governor could be called by the Parliament.
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes, with a press release.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision Press conference.
5.3 Publication of minutes No, but statistical releases are published after each policy meeting.
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes No.
5.5 Inflation report Monetary Policy Report.
5.6 Frequency Four–six per year, after every MPC meeting.26 Handbook No. 29  State of the art of inflation targeting
Guatemala
1. Inflation-Targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority Bank of Guatemala.
1.2 Legal mandate The central bank’s main policy objective is to attain price level stability.
1.3 Operational independence? Yes.
1.4 Date IT adopted 2005
1.5 Who sets the target? The Monetary Board.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? Headline CPI.
1.7 Current target December 2012:  4.5% ±1 percentage point.
From December 2013:  4.0%±1 percentage point.
1.8 Target horizon End of year
1.9 Key policy rate ‘Leading rate’ (‘tasa líder’) on overnight interbank deposits.
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body Monetary Board.
There are eight members:  the Governor;  the Minister of Public Finance;  the Minister of 
Economy;  the Minister of Agriculture;  a Director appointed by the national university;  a 
Director appointed by the chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture;  a Director 
appointed by the Guatemalan Banking Association;  and a Director appointed by the 
National Congress.
The General Manager of Banco de Guatemala and the Superintendent of Banks are permanent 
advisers to the Monetary Board but they do not have the right to vote.  Other permanent 
advisers are the Economics Manager, the Financial Manager, the legal Manager the Director of 
the Macroeconomic Analysis and Forecast Department, and the Director of the Monetary Policy 
Execution Department.
2.2 External members? Seven of the eight members are external.  The Governor is the only internal member of the 
Monetary Board.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members The Governor is appointed by the President of the Republic for a four-year term that does not 
coincide with the political cycle.  Ministers are ex officio members of the Board.  The Director 
appointed by National Congress does not have a fixed term.  All other Directors are appointed 
for one-year terms.  
2.4 Decision-making process By vote.
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting The Monetary Board meets weekly.  Interest decisions are made eight times a year.
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank A suite of models is used, which includes ARIMA models, an exponential smoothing model, and a 
Semi-structural Macroeconomic Model (MMS).
3.2 Published forecasts Inflation forecasts are published in the Monetary Policy Report.
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates Inflation forecasts from the Semi-structural Macroeconomic Model assume a particular 
(non-constant) path for the interest rate.
3.4 Forecast owned by The Bank’s staff.
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter No.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings The Governor has to appear twice a year before Congress to report on the conduct of monetary 
policy and the achievement of policy objectives.
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes, with a press release.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision Yes.  The Governor holds a press conference right after the decision is made.
5.3 Publication of minutes A summary of the argument presented in each interest rate decision meeting is available on the 
central bank’s website one month after the corresponding Monetary Board’s meeting.
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes  No.
5.5 Inflation Report Monetary Policy Report.
5.6 Frequency Three times a yearHandbook No. 29 State of the art of inflation targeting 27
Hungary
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB).
1.2 Legal mandate According to the Act on Magyar Nemzeti Bank, ‘the primary objective of the MNB shall be to 
achieve and maintain price stability’.
1.3 Operational independence? Yes.
1.4 Date IT adopted June 2001.
1.5 Who sets the target? Central bank.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? CPI.
1.7 Current target Since 2007:  3% per annum.
1.8 Target horizon Medium term.
1.9 Key policy rate Interest rate on two-week central bank bond.
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body Monetary Council.
Consists of at least five and at most nine members.  There are currently seven members.
The Governor, two Deputy Governors and external members.
A non-voting government representative attends the meeting.
2.2 External members? Four (from 2010).
2.3 Terms of appointment of members Six years.
2.4 Decision-making process By majority vote;  in case of a tie, the Governor has a casting vote.
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting Once a month.
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank Simple time series and expert models for short-term forecasts;  macro econometric and DSGE 
models for longer-term horizons.
3.2 Published forecasts Forecasts for headline CPI, core inflation, GDP and labour market indicators are published in 
the Quarterly Report on Inflation.
Fan charts surrounding the inflation and GDP projections are published in the Quarterly Report 
on Inflation.
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates Endogenous (since 2011).
3.4 Forecast owned by Staff of the MNB.
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter No.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings The Governor of the MNB reports annually to Parliament.
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes, at 14:00 with a press release after each rate-setting meeting.
5.2 Press conference after decision Yes (after scheduled rate-setting meetings).
5.3 Publication of minutes Yes, non-attributed, abridged minutes released regularly before the next rate-setting meeting.
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes Individual votes.
5.5 Inflation Report Quarterly Report on Inflation.
5.6 Frequency Four times a year.28 Handbook No. 29  State of the art of inflation targeting
Iceland
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority Central Bank of Iceland.
1.2 Legal mandate According to the Central Bank Act no. 36/2001, with a later amendment in February 2009, 
the Bank’s main objective is price stability and it is also obliged to contribute towards the 
government’s main economic policy objectives as long as that does not undermine the Bank’s 
main objective.
1.3 Operational independence? Yes.
1.4 Date IT adopted March 2001.
1.5 Who sets the target? The Bank sets the target with the approval of the Prime Minister.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? Twelve-month rise in headline CPI.
1.7 Current target 2.5%.
1.8 Target horizon On average.
1.9 Key policy rate Rate on 7-day collateral loans, current account deposit rate and rate on 28-day Central Bank 
Certificates of Deposits.  
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body A five-member Monetary Policy Committee consisting of the Governor, Vice Governor, the 
Chief Economist and two external members.
2.2 External members? Two external members.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members The Governor and Vice Governor are appointed for five-year terms with possible re-appointment 
for a second term.  The two external members are also appointed for five-year terms.
2.4 Decision-making process By consensus if possible, otherwise the Governor invites members to vote.  In case of a tie, the 
Governor has a casting vote.  
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting In normal times, a minimum of eight times per year.   
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank The core forecasting model is a medium-sized macroeconomic model (QMM).  This model is 
basically an empirically estimated error-correction type of model, but allows for forward-looking 
expectations.
The Bank also has a small New-Keynesian structural model and a medium-sized DSGE model 
(DYNIMO) is under construction.
Other models include VAR models and various short-term forecasting models.
3.2 Published forecasts A quarterly macroeconomic forecast is published four times a year in the Monetary Bulletin.
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates Interest rate path generated from macroeconomic model (a forward-looking Taylor rule with 
interest rate smoothing) and different non-model assumptions.
3.4 Forecast owned by Economics staff.
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter Yes.  If CPI deviates from the target by more than 1.5 percentage points in either direction, the 
Central Bank is obliged to present the government with an open report explaining the deviation 
from the target and the Bank’s responses.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings The Governor is required to appear before parliament twice a year.
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes, with a press release.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision Press conference.
5.3 Publication of minutes The minutes of Monetary Policy Meetings are made public.
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes  The balance of votes is included in the published minutes.  Individual votes are summarised in 
the Bank’s Annual Report.  
5.5 Inflation Report Monetary Bulletin.
5.6 Frequency Four times a year, two of which are short updates.  Handbook No. 29 State of the art of inflation targeting 29
Indonesia
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority Bank Indonesia (BI).
1.2 Legal mandate According to Act no. 23 of 1999 on Bank Indonesia, ‘the objective of Bank Indonesia is to 
achieve and maintain the stability of the rupiah value’.
1.3 Operational independence? Yes.
1.4 Date IT adopted July 2005.
1.5 Who sets the target? The government, after consultation with Bank Indonesia.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? Headline CPI.
1.7 Current target 2012:  4.5% ±1 percentage point.
1.8 Target horizon Over the medium term.
1.9 Key policy rate BI rate (This is a policy rate.  BI has an interest rate corridor to guide interbank money market 
rates).
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body Board of Governors:  Governor, and six Deputy Governors.
Currently there are seven members.
2.2 External members? No.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members Members are proposed and appointed by the President with the approval of the House of 
Representatives.
The term of office is five years and members can be re-appointed once.
2.4 Decision-making process The Board aims to reach an agreement through consensus:  if it fails the Governor will exercise 
his authority to decide.
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting Usually monthly.
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank Bank Indonesia uses a suite of models:
ARIMBI (Aggregate Rational Inflation Targeting Model for Bank Indonesia) is a DSGE model for
policy simulation.  
SOFIE (Short-Term Forecast Model for Indonesian Economy) is the main forecasting model.
It is a macro-econometrics model used for forecasting quarterly GDP components, inflation 
(both core & non-core), monetary aggregates and the exchange rate.
Time series models (ARIMA etc) are also used to support the monthly forecast of inflation 
and exchange rate and several leading and prompt indicators.
3.2 Published forecasts Range forecasts for inflation, GDP and GDP components are published.
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates Based on scenarios and expectations of inflation.
3.4 Forecast owned by Board of Governors.
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter No.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings Information on the monetary policy implemented in the previous year and the monetary policy 
plan and monetary target for the next year is reported to the President and The House of 
Representatives.
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision Press release.
5.3 Publication of minutes   No.
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes  No.
5.5 Inflation Report Monetary Policy Report.
5.6 Frequency  Four times a year.30 Handbook No. 29  State of the art of inflation targeting
Israel
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority Bank of Israel (BoI).
1.2 Legal mandate According to Bank of Israel Law, 5770-2010,(1) the goals of the Bank are:
‘a)  to maintain price stability as its central goal;
b)  to support other goals of the Government’s economic policy, especially growth, employment 
and narrowing social gaps, provided that this support...shall not prejudice the attainment of 
price stability...’.
1.3 Operational independence? Yes (de jure and de facto).
1.4 Date IT adopted Informally in 1992.
Fully fledged inflation targeting from June 1997.
1.5 Who sets the target? Government in consultation with the BoI Governor.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? Headline CPI.
1.7 Current target Target range of 1%–3%.
1.8 Target horizon Within no more than two years, continuously.  
1.9 Key policy rate Short-term interest rate (overnight transactions between BoI and banks).
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body Monetary Committee with six members, the Governor (chair), Deputy Governor and one more 
BoI employee, to be appointed by the Governor and ‘three additional members from among 
the public’.
2.2 External members? Yes, three out of six.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members The Governor is appointed by the President of the State on the recommendation of the 
Government.
The Governor and Deputy Governor are appointed for five-year terms, and can be re-appointed 
only once.
2.4 Decision-making process Majority vote.  Chair (Governor) has a tie-breaking vote.  
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting By law, at least eight times per year but meets monthly.
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank The BoI employs a suite of models along with judgement to produce forecasts.
3.2 Published forecasts The BoI staff forecast is published quarterly by the Research Department shortly after the 
interest rate decision for the month in which the forecast is prepared.  
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates Endogenous.
3.4 Forecast owned by Staff.
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter No but BoI Bill mandates that if inflation target is missed over more than six months, the IR must 
include reasons for miss and details of policy to return inflation to target.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings Yes, twice a year based on Monetary Policy Report.
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision Press release.
5.3 Publication of minutes   Yes, two weeks after the announcement of the interest rate decision (unless this will compromise 
monetary policy).
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance  Balance of votes must be published;  publication of individual votes is not mandated. 
of votes
5.5 Inflation Report Yes.
5.6 Frequency Twice a year.
(1) A new central bank law was enacted in March 2010.  The MPC was appointed in September 2011.  Handbook No. 29 State of the art of inflation targeting 31
Mexico
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority Banco de México.
1.2 Legal mandate According to Article 28 of the Mexican Constitution, the central bank’s main objective is to 
safeguard the purchasing power of the Mexican currency.
1.3 Operational independence? Yes.
1.4 Date IT adopted  2001.
1.5 Who sets the target? The Board of Governors.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? Headline CPI.
1.7 Current target Multi-annual inflation target.
Current target:  3% ±1%.
1.8 Target horizon Medium term.
1.9 Key policy rate Since January 2008:  tasa de fondeo bancario (overnight interbank rate).
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body The Board of Governors.  There are five members:  the Governor and four Deputy Governors.
2.2 External members? No.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members The Governor is appointed by the President of the Republic and confirmed by the Senate or the 
permanent commission for a six-year term.
Other members are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate or by the 
Permanent Commission for an eight-year term.
2.4 Decision-making process By consensus.
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting Eight times a year.
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank DSGE model.
Error Correction Model.
3.2 Published forecasts Inflation, GDP and employment.
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates The interest rate used in the forecast model is endogenous.  It comes from an optimal rule that 
minimises a loss function (output gap and inflation gap) subject to some economic conditions.
3.4 Forecast owned by Staff.
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter No.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings The Governor can be called for a parliamentary hearing when parliament deems necessary.
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision Press release.
5.3 Publication of minutes Yes, usually two weeks after the announcement of the policy decision.
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes No.
5.5 Inflation Report Yes.
5.6 Frequency  Four times a year.32 Handbook No. 29  State of the art of inflation targeting
New Zealand
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ)
1.2 Legal mandate The Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989 specifies that the primary function of the Reserve 
Bank shall be to deliver ‘stability in the general level of prices’.  The Act also says that the 
Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Reserve Bank shall together have a separate 
agreement setting out specific targets for achieving and maintaining price stability.  This is 
known as the Policy Targets Agreement (PTA).
1.3 Operational independence? Yes.
1.4 Date IT adopted December 1989.
1.5 Who sets the target? Governor and the Minister of Finance.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? Headline CPI.
1.7 Current target 1%–3% on average over the medium term.
The target is an agreement between the Minister of Finance and the Governor over their term 
of office.
The PTA also requires the Reserve Bank to, where possible, meet other aims (such as avoiding 
unnecessary volatility in interest rates and output) when pursuing price stability.
1.8 Target horizon Medium term.
1.9 Key policy rate Official Cash Rate (OCR).
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body The Governor is the single decision-maker.  The Official Cash Rate Advisory Group (OCRAG) 
provides advice to the Governor.  
2.2 External members? Two external advisors.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members The Governor and Board members are appointed by the Minister of Finance.  The Board advises 
the Minister on the appointment of a Governor.
The Governor is appointed for a five-year term which can be renewed.
OCRAG:  Internal members’ terms are not specified.  Some are ex officio members (eg Manger of 
Forecasting).  Others are at the invitation of the Governor.  
External advisors are appointed for two years.  
2.4 Decision-making process By the Governor.
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting Eight times a year.
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank A range of models is used when examining the outlook.  These include calibrated gap-form 
models, DSGE and statistical models (eg Factor Augmented VARs).  
Calibrated gaps model (RFM — Reduced-Form Model) is central forecasting model.  
3.2 Published forecasts Forecasts of GDP, inflation and interest rate projections are published four times a year in the 
Monetary Policy Statement.
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates Endogenous.
3.4 Forecast owned by MPC.
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter/other The Board is required to determine whether the Bank’s monetary policy statements ‘are 
consistent with the Bank’s primary function and the policy targets agreed with the Minister’.  
That is, they must make some judgement on each and every Monetary Policy Statement
contemporaneously.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings Yes.  Each quarter the Governor and senior staff appear before Parliament’s ‘Finance and 
expenditure select committee’ to discuss monetary policy.
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision Press notice for every decision.
Press conference four times a year when the Monetary Policy Statement is published.
5.3 Publication of minutes No.
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes n/a.
5.5 Inflation Report Monetary Policy Statement.
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Norway
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority Norges Bank.
1.2 Legal mandate Royal Decree of 29 March 2001 states that the implementation of monetary policy shall ‘be 
oriented towards low and stable inflation’ and shall also contribute to stabilising output and 
employment.
1.3 Operational independence? Yes.
1.4 Date IT adopted March 2001.
1.5 Who sets the target?  Government.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? Headline CPI.
1.7 Current target Close to 2.5% over time.
1.8 Target horizon Medium term.
1.9 Key policy rate Key rate.
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body Norges Bank’s Executive Board.
There are seven members:  the Governor (chairperson), the Deputy Governor and five external 
members.
2.2 External members? Yes, five external members.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members All seven members are appointed by the King.
The Governor and the Deputy Governor are appointed for a six-year term and can be 
re-appointed once.
The other five members are appointed for four-year terms and can be re-appointed for a total 
period of twelve years.
2.4 Decision-making process By consensus.
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting Six per year.
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank DSGE models and a suite of forecasting models for ‘nowcasting’.
3.2 Published forecasts Fan chart forecasts for key policy rate, output gap, CPI and CPIXE (CPI adjusted for tax changes 
and excluding temporary changes in energy prices) are published in the Monetary Policy Report.
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates Endogenous.
3.4 Forecast owned by Governor.
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter No.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings The Governor provides an assessment of monetary policy in an open hearing before the 
Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs in connection with the Credit Report.
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes, with the monetary policy statement.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision Press conference and press notice.
5.3 Publication of minutes No.
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes Consensus decision.
5.5 Inflation Report Monetary Policy Report.
5.6 Frequency  Three times a year.34 Handbook No. 29  State of the art of inflation targeting
Peru
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority Central Reserve Bank of Peru.
1.2 Legal mandate According to the Organic Law, the purpose of the bank is to preserve monetary stability.
1.3 Operational independence? Yes.
1.4 Date IT adopted January 2002.
1.5 Who sets the target? The target is approved by the Board of Directors.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? Headline inflation.
1.7 Current target Since early 2007:  2% ±1 percentage point.
1.8 Target horizon At all times.
1.9 Key policy rate Reference interest rate.
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body The Board of Directors composed of seven members, including the Governor.
2.2 External members? No.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members The Executive Branch appoints four members, including the President of the central bank.
Congress ratifies the appointment of the President and appoints the other three members.
All members of the Board are renewed on 28 July of each General Election year, and necessarily 
within 30 days of the beginning of the first ordinary legislature.
Members must be Peruvian and do not represent any entity or particular interest.
2.4 Decision-making process By vote.
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting Monthly.
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank A semi-structural Quarterly forecasting model (MPT).
A DSGE model (MEGA-D model).
VAR type models for short-run forecasts (SPD).
3.2 Published forecasts The following forecasts are published in the Inflation Report:
Fan chart forecast of inflation and GDP.
GDP components.
Public sector balance.  
Balance of payments.
GDP growth and inflation in Peru’s main trading partners.
Terms of trade.
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates Depends on economic environment.  Currently interest rates are set according to Taylor-type 
rule.
3.4 Forecast owned by The central bank.
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter No.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings The Governor goes to the parliament regularly, once per year, to explain the monetary 
assumptions of the government budget and occasionally whenever he is called upon to present 
monetary policy measures as well as forecasts.
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes, with an informative note.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision Telephone conferences with the press are held in the morning after the decision.
5.3 Publication of minutes No.
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes No.
5.5 Inflation Report Yes.
5.6 Frequency Three times a year until 2008.  From 2009 onwards, four times a year.Handbook No. 29 State of the art of inflation targeting 35
Philippines
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
1.2 Legal mandate According to the New Central Bank Act, the primary objective of BSP is ‘to promote price 
stability conducive to a balanced and sustainable growth of the economy’.
1.3 Operational independence? Yes.
1.4 Date IT adopted January 2002.
1.5 Who sets the target? The National Government (through the Development Budget and Co-ordination Committee) in 
consultation with the BSP.
The inflation target is announced two years in advance.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? Average year-on-year change in headline CPI.
1.7 Current target 2012:  4.0% ±1 percentage point.
2013:  4.0% ±1 percentage point.
2014:  4.0% ±1 percentage point.
1.8 Target horizon Medium term.
1.9 Key policy rate Key policy interest rates for:
overnight borrowing or reverse repurchase (RRP) facility;
overnight lending or repurchase (RP) facility;  and
term RRPs, RPs, and special deposit accounts (SDAs).
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body The Monetary Board.
2.2 External members? No, although the Monetary Board includes a Cabinet member who serves as government 
representative.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members Monetary Board:
Consists of seven members appointed by the President of the Philippines.
One of the members is a member of the Cabinet.  
Other members serve six-year terms, can be re-appointed, and may only be removed for cause.
2.4 Decision-making process The Advisory Committee is an internal technical body composed of senior Bank officials tasked 
to deliberate, discuss and make recommendations on monetary policy to the Monetary Board.  
It meets every six weeks prior to the Monetary Board meeting.
The Advisory Committee has five members:  the Governor, the Deputy Governor for Monetary 
Stability, the Deputy Governor for Supervision and Examination, the Assistant Governor of the 
Monetary Policy Subsector and the Assistant Governor of the Treasury Department.  
The Monetary Board is the decision-making body that decides on the policy interest rates.  
Decisions are taken by vote.
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting Eight times a year.  
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank Single equation model, a multi-equation model.
A long-term macroeconomic model and Forecasting and Policy Analysis System (FPAS) are 
currently being developed.  DSGE model for policy simulation.  
3.2 Published forecasts A fan chart forecast for inflation is published in the Inflation Report.
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates Constant policy interest rates.
3.4 Forecast owned by BSP (inflation forecast).
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter Yes.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings Quarterly letter submitted to the President and Congress on economic developments.
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes, with a media release.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision Yes, press release and press conference after the policy decision.
5.3 Publication of minutes Yes.  Highlights of the meeting, which summarises the issues discussed and is approved by the 
Monetary Board, is published four weeks after the decision-making meeting.
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes  No.
5.5 Inflation Report Yes.
5.6 Frequency Four times a year.36 Handbook No. 29  State of the art of inflation targeting
Poland
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority National Bank of Poland (NBP).
1.2 Legal mandate According to The Act on the National Bank of Poland, ‘the basic objective of NBP activity shall 
be to maintain price stability, and it shall at the same time act in support of Government 
economic policies, insofar as this does not constrain pursuit of the basic objective of the NBP’.
1.3 Operational independence? Yes.
1.4 Date IT adopted 1998.
1.5 Who sets the target? Monetary Policy Council.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? Headline CPI.
1.7 Current target Since 2004:  2.5%±1 percentage point.
1.8 Target horizon Medium term.
1.9 Key policy rate Reference rate (ie the rate that determines the yield on the main OMOs).  
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body The Monetary Policy Council consists of ten members:  the president of the central bank (chair) 
plus nine external members.
2.2 External members? Yes, nine.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members The term of all external MPC members is six years (non-renewable).
The president of the central bank is appointed by the Parliament at the request of the President 
of Poland for a six-year term, and can be re-appointed once.
Of the nine other members, three are appointed by the Lower House of the Parliament;  three 
are appointed by the Upper House of the Parliament and three are appointed by the President 
of Poland.
The Act on NBP specifies that the MPC members should be specialists in the field of finance.  In 
practice the MPC members are mostly economists.  While serving on the MPC, they are not 
allowed to conduct any professional activity except for academic, research or educational 
activity, nor be active in any political party or trade union.
2.4 Decision-making process By majority vote when there is a motion to change policy.  The chairperson has a casting vote.
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting Monthly.
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank Suite of macroeconomic models, with a quarterly structural macroeconomic model 
being the main forecasting tool and a DSGE model being used for internal analysis.  
3.2 Published forecasts Fan chart forecasts of inflation and GDP are published in the Inflation Report and in an 
accompanying presentation.  
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates Constant interest rates.
3.4 Forecast owned by Staff.
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter No.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings The Monetary Policy Council draws up annual monetary policy guidelines and submits these to 
the Lower House of Parliament (Sejm), for information, together with the submission by the 
Council of Ministers of the draft budget.
The MPC presents a report to the Sejm on the implementation of monetary policy guidelines 
within five months of the end of the fiscal year.  After submitting the report, the central bank 
president reports on monetary policy in the preceding year at a parliamentary hearing.  
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes, with a press release.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision Yes, MPC policy statement and press conference.  
5.3 Publication of minutes Yes, two weeks after decision-making meeting.  
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes Not in the minutes.  But the votes of each member are published on the central bank website 
after six weeks and included in the Inflation Report.
5.5 Inflation Report Yes.
5.6 Frequency Three times a year.Handbook No. 29 State of the art of inflation targeting 37
Romania
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority National Bank of Romania (NBR).
1.2 Legal mandate Pursuant to Law no. 312/28 June 2004, the primary objective of the NBR is to ensure and 
maintain price stability.  Without prejudice to its primary objective, the NBR supports the 
general economic policy of the Government.
1.3 Operational independence? Yes.
1.4 Date IT adopted August 2005.
1.5 Who sets the target? The target is jointly set by the NBR and the government.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? Headline inflation rate.
1.7 Current target End 2012:  3% ±1 percentage point.
From 2013:  2.5% ±1 percentage point.
1.8 Target horizon From 2013 flat multiannual target.
1.9 Key policy rate Monetary policy rate.
Interest rates on the standing facilities (the deposit facility and the lending facility) were set at 
±4 percentage points around the monetary policy rate.
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body Board of Directors:  nine members:  the Governor (chairperson);  first Deputy Governor (Vice 
chair);  two Deputy Governors and five non-executive (external) members.
The Minister of Public Finance and one of the State Secretaries in the Ministry of Public Finance 
may participate, without voting rights, in the Board’s meetings.
2.2 External members? Five.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members Members of the Board are appointed by the Parliament of Romania on the recommendation of 
the standing committees of the two Chambers of the Parliament.
Board members are appointed for a five-year term that can be renewed.
2.4 Decision-making process By vote.
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting Eight times a year.
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank Near-term Inflation Forecasting:  ARMAX model and expert judgement for the CPI components.  
Near-term GDP forecasting:  OLS and 2SLS estimation with error correction mechanism, 
Dynamic Factor Models.  
Medium-term forecasting:  semi-structural New-Keynesian model.
3.2 Published forecasts Forecasts of inflation and GDP gap are published in the Inflation Report.  Forecasts of CPI 
components, including core inflation are published.  
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates The interest rate projection is derived from a model-based monetary policy reaction function 
(Taylor rule).  Alternative working hypotheses may sometimes be used, which imply a smoother 
trajectory for the interest rate or embed Board suggestions, but along the guidelines of the 
Taylor rule.
3.4 Forecast owned by NBR Board.
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter No.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings No.  The NBR’s Annual Report, which includes the main economic, financial monetary and 
foreign exchange developments;  monetary policy during the previous year and the guidelines 
for the following year, is submitted to Parliament.
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes, with a press release.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision Press release after each Board meeting and press conference four times a year concomitantly 
with the release of the Inflation Report.
5.3 Publication of minutes No.
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes No.
5.5 Inflation Report Yes.
5.6 Frequency Four times a year.38 Handbook No. 29  State of the art of inflation targeting
Serbia
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority National Bank of Serbia (NBS).
1.2 Legal mandate As stated in the Law on the National Bank of Serbia, the primary objective is to achieve and 
maintain price stability.  In addition to its primary objective, the NBS shall also strive to maintain 
financial stability.  Without prejudice to its primary objective, the NBS shall support the 
pursuance of the economic policy of the Government of the Republic of Serbia, operating in 
accordance with the principles of market economy.  
1.3 Operational independence? Yes.
1.4 Date IT adopted Informally since September 2006, formally since January 2009.
1.5 Who sets the target? The target is set by the NBS, in co-operation with the Government.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? Headline inflation.
1.7 Current target 2012 end level:  4% ±1.5 percentage points.
1.8 Target horizon Medium term.
1.9 Key policy rate The interest rate on two-week repo operation.
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body Executive Board of the NBS consisting of five members:  the Governor and four Vice Governors.
The NBS may have two to four Vice Governors.  The Minister of Finance may attend but not vote.
2.2 External members? No.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members The Governor:  appointed by the National Assembly upon the proposal of the President.
Three Vice Governors:  appointed by the Council of the NBS upon the proposal of the Governor.
All members are appointed for a six-year term, renewable.
2.4 Decision-making process By majority vote.  The Governor has a casting vote.
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting Once a month (or more frequently if necessary).
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank Quarterly Projection Model.
3.2 Published forecasts A fan chart projection of inflation is published in the Inflation Report.
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates Endogenous path for policy rate.  This is communicated verbally.
3.4 Forecast owned by Executive Board.
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter If inflation deviates from the target for more than six consecutive months, NBS notifies the 
Government in writing about the reasons for such deviations, the measures to be taken and the 
time needed for inflation to return to the target.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings The NBS submits to the National Assembly the monetary policy programme for the next year, 
semi-annual and annual reports on the implementation of monetary policy, Annual Report on 
the stability of the financial system, and Annual Report on its operations and results.  The 
Governor explains the monetary policy programme and reports to the National Assembly, but 
the National Assembly may not give any instructions to the NBS based on submitted reports.
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes, with a press release.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision Yes, press conference.
5.3 Publication of minutes Not at present.
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes No.
5.5 Inflation Report Yes.
5.6 Frequency Four times a year.Handbook No. 29 State of the art of inflation targeting 39
South Africa
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority South African Reserve Bank.
1.2 Legal mandate As stated in both the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and in the South African 
Reserve Bank Act, No 90 of 1989, the primary objective is to protect the value of the currency in 
the interest of balanced and sustainable economic growth.  The Bank regards its primary goal as 
the achievement and maintenance of price stability, and together with other institutions, it also 
plays a pivotal role in ensuring financial stability.
1.3 Operational independence? Yes.
1.4 Date IT adopted February 2000.
1.5 Who sets the target? The Government sets the target after consultation with the Bank.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? From January 2009, the twelve-month increase in headline CPI.
1.7 Current target A target range of 3%–6%.
1.8 Target horizon On a continuous basis.
1.9 Key policy rate Repo rate.
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body Monetary Policy Committee;  there are eight members:  the Governor, three Deputy Governors 
and four senior officials of the Bank.
2.2 External members?. No.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members The President of the Republic of South Africa appoints the Governor and Deputy Governors of 
the Bank after consultations with the Minister of Finance and the Board of Directors of the Bank.
Other MPC members are appointed by the Governor.
The Governor and Deputy Governors are appointed for five-year terms and can be re-appointed.  
Re-appointment terms may be less than five years.  
2.4 Decision-making process By consensus.
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting Usually six times a year.
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank A core macro econometric model specifically suited for inflation targeting purposes, 
complemented by a suite of other models.
3.2 Published forecasts Fan chart forecasts of inflation and GDP growth are published in the Monetary Policy Review
twice a year.
The main elements of the central forecasts are described in the MPC statement published after 
each meeting.
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates Constant.
3.4 Forecast owned by MPC.
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter No.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings The Governor appears before the Portfolio Committee on Finance at least three times a year.
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes, with a press release.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision Yes, live television coverage and webcast.
5.3 Publication of minutes No, but a Statement of the Monetary Policy Committee is published.
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes n/a.
5.5 Inflation Report Monetary Policy Review.
5.6 Frequency Twice a year.40 Handbook No. 29  State of the art of inflation targeting
South Korea
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority Bank of Korea (BOK).
1.2 Legal mandate According to the Bank of Korea Act of 2003, the Bank’s main objective is to promote price 
stability.
1.3 Operational independence? Yes, since 2003.
1.4 Date IT adopted April 1998.
1.5 Who sets the target? The Bank sets the target in consultation with the Government.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? From 2007, headline CPI.
1.7 Current target 3% ±1 percentage point.
1.8 Target horizon Three years.
1.9 Key policy rate Bank of Korea Base Rate.
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body Monetary Policy Committee.  There are seven members:  the Governor (chairperson), Senior 
Deputy Governor and five externally appointed members.
2.2 External members? Five full time externally appointed members.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members The Governor is appointed by the President for a four-year term.  The senior Deputy Governor is 
appointed by the President for a three-year term
Of the appointed members, the Governor, the Minister of Strategy and Finance, the chairman 
of the Financial Services Commission, the President of the Korea Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry and the chairman of the Korea Federation of Banks each recommend one member.
Appointed members have a four-year term and may be re-appointed.
2.4 Decision-making process By vote.
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting Monthly.
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank BOK Dynamic Projection Model;  DSGE model.
3.2 Published forecasts Point forecasts are published for GDP and inflation.
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates Market.
3.4 Forecast owned by BOK.
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter No.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings The Governor testifies before the Strategy and Finance Committee of the National Assembly.
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes, with a press release.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision Yes, press conference.
5.3 Publication of minutes Yes, on the first Tuesday six weeks after the meeting.
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes No.
5.5 Inflation Report Monetary Policy Report.
5.6 Frequency Twice a year.Handbook No. 29 State of the art of inflation targeting 41
Sweden
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority Sveriges Riksbank.
1.2 Legal mandate The objective for monetary policy is to maintain price stability.  It is also to support the 
objectives of general economic policy with a view to achieving sustainable growth and high 
employment.  
1.3 Operational independence? Yes.
1.4 Date IT adopted The inflation target regime was announced in January 1993 and applied as of 1995.
1.5 Who sets the target? Sveriges Riksbank.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? Annual change in headline CPI.
1.7 Current target Point target of 2%.
1.8 Target horizon Normally over two years, but in some circumstances it may be extended.
1.9 Key policy rate Repo rate.
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body Executive Board of the Riksbank.  There are six members:  the Governor (chairperson) and 
five Deputy Governors.
2.2 External members? No.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members All members are appointed by the General Council, which in turn is appointed by the Swedish 
parliament.
The term of appointment is five or six years according to a rolling schedule.
Members may be re-appointed.
2.4 Decision-making process By vote:  the Governor has a casting vote.
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting Six times a year.
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank A suite of models including time series models, indicator models, structural models (eg DSGE 
models) and a large number of smaller models that focus on important relationships in the 
economy.
3.2 Published forecasts Fan chart forecasts for GDP, CPI and the repo rate are published in the Monetary Policy Report
and Monetary Policy Update.
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates Since the beginning of 2007, forecasts are made based on an endogenous interest rate path.
3.4 Forecast owned by Board of Governors.
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter No.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings Yes.  The Riksbank must present a written account of monetary policy to the Riksbank 
Committee on Finance at least twice a year.  The Governor presents this account to the 
Committee. 
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision A press release is published the day after each monetary policy meeting.
5.3 Publication of minutes Yes, two weeks after the meeting.
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes Yes.
5.5 Inflation Report Monetary Policy Report and Monetary Policy Updates published.
5.6 Frequency Three Monetary Policy Reports are published per year and on the other three occasions a 
Monetary Policy Update is published.42 Handbook No. 29  State of the art of inflation targeting
Thailand
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority Bank of Thailand (BOT).
1.2 Legal mandate As stated in the Bank of Thailand Act B.E. 2485 as amended by B.E.2008:  ‘The BOT implements 
monetary policy as specified by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in order to promote 
monetary stability and formulate monetary policies’.
1.3 Operational independence? Yes.
1.4 Date IT adopted May 2000.
1.5 Who sets the target? A target is set by the MPC on an annual basis, no later than December.
The target shall be reached in agreement with the Minister of Finance, which will then require 
approval by the Cabinet.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core?(1) Headline.
1.7 Current target(1) 3.0% ±1.5 percentage points.
1.8 Target horizon Eight quarters.
1.9 Key policy rate One-day repurchase transaction rate.
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body Monetary Policy Committee (MPC).  There are seven members:  the Governor (chairman), 
two Deputy Governors and four external members.
2.2 External members? Yes, four.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members The governor is appointed for a five-year term and can be re-appointed once.
External members have a fixed-term of three years, and cannot serve more than two 
consecutive terms.
2.4 Decision-making process Majority vote.
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting Meets eight times a year in line with reserve maintenance period (two weeks).
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank The Bank of Thailand uses a suite of models:
￿ Bank of Thailand’s Macroeconomic Model (BOTMM) is used to make forecasts of economic 
variables relevant to monetary policy decision-making.
￿ Other models that are currently developed include a semi-structural model and a dynamic 
general equilibrium model.
3.2 Published forecasts Fan chart forecasts of core inflation and GDP growth are published in the Inflation Report.
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates Constant at the prevailing rate throughout the forecast horizon.  
3.4 Forecast owned by MPC.
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter Yes.  Under the new arrangement between BOT and Ministry of Finance(MoF), in the event that 
the target is missed, the MPC is expected to explain the reasons thereof, how policy is expected 
to bring inflation back into the target range, and the time frame in which this is expected to 
occur, in an open letter to the MoF.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings The MPC is required to report monetary policy developments to the Cabinet every six months.
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes, with a press release.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision Press conference.
5.3 Publication of minutes Yes, after two weeks.
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes Balance of votes.
5.5 Inflation Report Yes.
5.6 Frequency Four times a year.
(1) Before 2012 the target was core inflation, excluding raw food and energy.  In January 2012 a target of headline inflation of 3.0% ±1.5 percentage points was proposed but not yet
approved by cabinet.  The law allows for the use of the previous year’s target (core inflation of 0.5%–3%) to be used until the new one is approved.  Handbook No. 29 State of the art of inflation targeting 43
Turkey
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.
1.2 Legal mandate From The Law on the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, ‘the primary objective of the Bank 
shall be to achieve and maintain price stability’.
1.3 Operational independence? Yes.
1.4 Date IT adopted January 2006.
1.5 Who sets the target? The Monetary Policy Committee determines the inflation target together with the Government 
within the framework of the monetary policy strategy.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? Annual CPI.
1.7 Current target 2012:  5.0% ±2 percentage points.
2013:  5.0% ±2 percentage points.
2014:  5.0% ±2 percentage points.
1.8 Target horizon Multi-year horizon (three years).
1.9 Key policy rate  One week repo auction rate.  Interest rate corridor and required reserve ratios also used as 
policy instruments.  
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body Monetary Policy Committee:
There are seven members:  the Governor (chairperson);  four Vice Governors;  one member 
elected by and from among the Board, and a member to be appointed by a joint decree on the 
recommendation of the Governor.
The Undersecretary of the Treasury/Deputy Undersecretary may participate in the meetings 
without voting rights.
2.2 External members? One member is an externally appointed academic.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members The Governor and Vice Governors are appointed for five-year terms, and can be re-appointed.
The external member appointed by a joint decree also has a term of office of five years.
2.4 Decision-making process By vote.  In the case of a tie, the Governor has the casting vote.
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting Monthly.
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank Quarterly Forecast Model.  A DSGE model is being developed.
3.2 Published forecasts Fan chart forecasts of headline and core inflation, plus output gap.
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates Endogenous.
3.4 Forecast owned by Monetary Policy Committee.
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter Yes.  In the event of a target miss, the Bank submits an open letter to the Government at the end 
of the year, setting out the reasons the target was missed.  During the year, such explanations are 
contained in the Inflation Report.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings Yes, twice a year.
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes, with a press release.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision No.
5.3 Publication of minutes Yes, a summary of the Monetary Policy Committee meeting is released within five working 
days after the meeting.
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes No.
5.5 Inflation Report Yes.
5.6 Frequency Four times a year.44 Handbook No. 29  State of the art of inflation targeting
United Kingdom
1. Inflation-targeting framework
1.1 Monetary authority Bank of England.
1.2 Legal mandate According to the 1998 Bank of England Act:
‘a)  to maintain price stability;  and
b)  subject to that, to support the economic policy of Her Majesty’s Government including its 
objectives for growth and employment.’
The precise remit for the MPC is restated annually by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
1.3 Operational independence? Yes.
1.4 Date IT adopted October 1992.
1.5 Who sets the target? Government.  The target is reaffirmed each year by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the 
annual budget statement.
1.6 Target measure;  headline or core? Twelve-month increase in headline CPI.
1.7 Current target Point target of 2% annual rate of inflation.
1.8 Target horizon At all times.
1.9 Key policy rate  Bank Rate (one week repo rate).  Since 2009 asset purchases have been used as an additional 
instrument.  
2. Decision-making
2.1 Decision-making body Monetary Policy Committee (MPC).  There are nine members:  the Governor (chairperson), the 
two Deputy Governors, the Bank’s Chief Economist, the Executive Director for Markets and 
four external members.
2.2 External members? Four external members, who, by law, are appointed on the basis of their experience and 
expertise in monetary policy.
2.3 Terms of appointment of members Governor, Deputy Governors appointed by the Crown on advice from government for five year 
renewable terms.  Chief Economist and Executive Director for Markets appointed by the 
Governor after consultation with the Chancellor.
External members are appointed by the Chancellor for three years, renewable once.
2.4 Decision-making process By vote, on a one-person one-vote basis.
The Governor has the casting vote if there is no majority.
Any member in a minority is asked to say what level of interest rates (or asset purchases) he or 
she would have preferred.
2.5 Frequency of decision-making meeting Monthly.
3. Modelling and forecasting
3.1 Type of models used by central bank The Bank of England uses a suite of models, both statistical and theoretical.  A new DSGE model 
COMPASS (Central Organising Model for Projections Analysis and Scenario Simulation) was 
introduced in 2011.
3.2 Published forecasts Fan chart forecasts of inflation and GDP are published every quarter in the Inflation Report.
3.3 Forecast assumption on interest rates Forecasts are conditioned on market expectations of interest rates and constant rates.
3.4 Forecast owned by MPC.
4. Accountability mechanisms
4.1 Open letter Yes.  If inflation deviates from the target by more than 1 percentage point in either direction, the 
Governor must write an open letter to the Chancellor explaining the reasons for this and what 
actions the Bank is taking.
4.2 Parliamentary hearings Parliamentary hearings are held at least three times per year.
5. Communication and publications
5.1 Immediate announcement of policy 
decision Yes, with a press release.
5.2 Press notice/conference after decision News release but no press conference.
5.3 Publication of minutes Yes, two weeks after MPC meeting.
5.4 Publication of individual votes/balance 
of votes Individual votes are published.
5.5 Inflation Report Yes, with a press conference.
5.6 Frequency Four times a year.Handbook No. 29 State of the art of inflation targeting 45
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